

2026

**Election
Integrity
Playbook**

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1. Introduction

What Is This Playbook For?

The purpose of this playbook is to assist your office in preparing for and responding to threats that could undermine free, fair, and secure elections this November. Because your office is best positioned to understand your jurisdiction's needs, it does not provide a one-size-fits-all approach. Instead, **the playbook is designed to help your office prepare its plan of action in response to likely election interference, particularly to identify key partners and allies and to consider in advance how to share timely and accurate information.** The playbook assumes your office already has the legal strategy well in hand. **It focuses on coordination, communication, and logistics.**

Each numbered chapter addresses a group of similar threats, and the chapters' order roughly tracks the period in the election cycle when certain threats would be more likely to arise. For example, the chapter immediately following this introduction covers various threats arising from disinformation, which has been a continuous problem across election cycles, and the final substantive chapter addresses threats to the certification of election results and the seating of duly elected prevailing candidates.

Sections within each chapter address specific threats and contain information, prompts, and tools to support your office. Each section's components are designed as a foundation for your office to build on and adapt to your circumstances. They include:

- **The Threat**—a short description of the general type of threat addressed, which is meant to be indicative, not exhaustive.
- **Key Messages**—general talking points that your office could consider adapting to your state's specific circumstances.
- **Partners and Allies**—a description of actions others are likely to take to combat the threat and a prompt for you to consider whom to contact, when, and how.
- **Your Plan**—a series of prompts to help you assess how your office and your partners will prepare and respond as the particular threat takes shape.
- **Resources**—a micro-bibliography of relevant public resources prepared by organizations focused on democracy protection and election integrity.

Following the substantive chapters is an appendix intended to suggest contact information your office may need this election cycle. Importantly, the playbook does not provide legal advice, opine on litigation strategy, or seek to direct the activity of government actors, nonprofits, community organizations, or any other entities.

Principles for Coordination and Communication in Response to Election Interference

Plan Ahead

State and local officials are used to navigating uncertain environments and know that advance planning can turn a situation from overwhelming to manageable. This election cycle is already presenting challenges that would have been unthinkable until recent years.

Across the country, state attorneys general, secretaries of state, and other state and local election officials are rising to the occasion—working together to ensure elections in 2026 reflect the will of the American people. Your office and its partners can build on those efforts, using this playbook and other resources to focus on key threats and develop a plan for how to communicate, share information, and coordinate your response.

Communicate Confidence

Election interference works by creating confusion, fear, and distrust. State leaders know to respond in ways that reinforce voters' confidence in the election and in their own power to participate.

- **Lead with your values and what you are protecting.** Start with voters, free and fair elections, the rule of law, and the state's responsibility to protect the democratic process—not with the latest false claim or provocation.
- **Call out bad actors and their goals.** Do not get trapped rebutting every allegation or falsehood. Identify the conduct, who is responsible, and why they are doing it.
- **Leave voters and local officials informed and empowered.** Explain what the state is doing, reinforce that the lawful election process will move forward, and tell voters or officials what they can do next.

Engage with Partners

State and local officials, nonprofits and community groups, and religious and business leaders are coming together to support free, fair, and secure elections this year. It will be crucial to leverage the strengths of these partners and allies through effective coordination and communication.

Manage Logistics and Communications Alongside Litigation

State attorneys general know how to litigate and have a strong record of reining in federal overreach. But court victories are only part of an effective strategy. To prepare for the 2026 midterm elections, state and local leaders will have to invest as much effort and creativity in managing the logistics and communications of responding to election interference as litigators have invested in their legal strategies. The pages that follow are designed to support that process.

Connecting with Partners and Scenario Planning: PSLC Is Here to Help

As your office reviews this playbook, keep in mind that PSLC is ready to assist. We are happy to connect you with key partners, allies, and experts working to ensure the integrity of our elections. PSLC staff are also available to design, plan, and facilitate scenario planning and tabletop exercises to help your office pressure test its election-protection plans and strengthen communication and coordination in your state.

Please do not hesitate to reach out!

2. Disinformation

False Claims About Previous Elections and Other “Evidence” of Voter Fraud, Noncitizen Registration, Security Breaches, or Foreign Interference

⚠ Early Warning Signs ⚠	
• Federal officials preview “proof” without releasing the underlying material or explaining how it supports their conclusions.	• Old allegations suddenly appear across social media and are repeated by multiple federal officials and their allies.
• Claims about previous elections are paired with predictions of similar misconduct in 2026.	• Federal officials seek records or equipment based on previously rejected claims.

The Threat

President Trump and members of his administration are using discredited claims about the 2020 election to cast doubt on the 2026 midterms and to justify new federal pressure on state and local election officials. On July 16, President Trump delivered a [prime-time address about alleged election tampering](#), but the documents he released [fell far short of substantiating his promised proof](#). The speech nevertheless renewed demands for federal restrictions on voting, and Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin subsequently [threatened state and local election officials with prosecution](#) if they declined to cooperate with the administration’s election review. The administration may use its thin evidentiary record as a platform for additional investigations, data demands, and efforts to undermine confidence in an unfavorable result.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: Do not repeat and rebut every recycled allegation. Focus on why these claims are being revived and what your state is doing now.

- Voters decide our elections—not politicians who can’t get over an old defeat. President Trump is repeating the same tired claims about 2020 that courts, election officials, and members of his own administration rejected years ago.

- The Trump administration has repeatedly tried to turn self-serving allegations into a reason to interfere in elections run by the states.
- States run elections—not the President. And our state will stay focused on the election in front of us: protecting voters, enforcing the law, and making sure the results reflect the people’s choice.
- We have heard these claims before. They failed under scrutiny then. Repeating them from the White House does not make them true now.

Partners and Allies

Election protection organizations will either issue or update previously published debunking reports to address new or revived false claims. Key validators will seek media appearances to reject false rumors and point voters to trusted sources of information, primarily state and local election officials. Election protection groups will likely circulate recommended talking points.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- Which state officials will respond to claims about voting equipment security, allegations of noncitizen voting or foreign interference, and threats of federal retaliation?

- *Have the AG’s office and chief election official already drafted talking points in response to previous instances of disinformation?*
- *How will the AG’s office and chief election official keep their messages consistent?*

- Who will communicate with local election officials regarding federal claims or threats that implicate their operations?

- What steps will the AG’s office take to “pre-bunk” false election claims by directing journalists, community organizations, voters, and the public to accurate information about election security?

- *Have state officials already briefed local media figures on subjects that are likely targets of misinformation, such as,*
 - *state processes to ensure that only citizens are registered to vote,*
 - *safety measures to secure data and equipment from interference (with actual walk-throughs in key election offices),*
 - *overlapping processes to confirm election results?*

Resources

- [What's Breaking Through About the Trump Administration's 2020 Election Investigation](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Tested messages and factual background for responding to renewed claims about 2020.
- [Why Would Someone Lie About Our Elections?](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Analysis of the political, financial, and foreign-policy motives behind election disinformation.
- [How the Trump Administration Plans to Interfere with the 2026 Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Overview of the administration's "deceive, disrupt, deny" strategy and available guardrails.
- [Election Mistrust Runs High. Your Newsroom Can Help.](#) — **Poynter**. Shows how explanatory reporting on election procedures and safeguards can build public trust and resilience against false claims.
- [Election Subversion: The 2024 Election and Recommendations to Address Vulnerabilities to the Electoral System](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Review of recent election-subversion tactics and recommendations for future cycles.
- [Sharing the Facts About Trump's Second Executive Order on Elections](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Current factual and communications guidance concerning the administration's second election executive order.
- [The Anatomy of a Fake Election Report](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Checklist for identifying unreliable data, weak methodologies, and purported expert reports.
- [Watch Out for False Voter-Fraud Claims Fueled by the SAVE Program](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Guidance on data limitations, analytical errors, and misleading claims based on SAVE results.
- [Election Technology Resources](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Information on testing, certification, access controls, technology security, and voting-system communications.
- [FAQ: Voting System Vulnerabilities and How They Can Be Weaponized](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Distinguishes a vulnerability from evidence of exploitation—and exploitation from proof that votes or election outcomes changed.
- [Countdown to the Midterms: Reexamining Foreign Influence in the 2020 Election](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Explains the distinction between foreign influence operations and technical interference with registration, voting, tabulation, or results.

- [Voter Registration Database Protections Are Resilient](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Explains safeguards protecting official voter-registration databases and why references to vulnerabilities do not show that prior elections were compromised.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state.*

False or Misleading Information About Where and How to Vote or About Physical Security at Polling Locations (Including Deepfakes and Other AI-Generated Content)

The Threat

Foreign influence operations, political actors, and anonymous online accounts have circulated false voting instructions and fabricated reports of danger to disrupt participation in elections. Although the 2024 election saw little voting disruption tied to foreign interference, [inauthentic videos that misused the FBI’s name and insignia called for Americans to “vote remotely” because of a fabricated terrorism threat and hoax bomb threats briefly closed polling locations in several battleground states](#). AI raises the risk that voters will be deceived by deepfakes or other deceptive content. For example, during the 2024 New Hampshire primary, an [AI-generated robocall mimicked President Biden’s voice and urged voters not to participate](#). This cycle, false claims about polling hours, locations, identification requirements, immigration enforcement and police activity, or security threats could confuse voters and deter participation.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Provide correct information without giving false claims or deceptive content more oxygen. Lead with useful facts and send voters to a trusted source.*

- Every eligible voter deserves clear information and a fair chance to be heard. Anonymous posts, deepfakes, and phony alerts do not get to decide who participates in our election.
- Rumors online cannot change voting hours, move a polling place, or rewrite the rules established by law.
- AI can make a fake look and sound convincing. That does not make it true.
- If a real emergency affects a voting location, state and local officials will say what happened, which location is affected, and what voters should do next.

- When you're planning how to vote, check and rely on *[official state election website]*. If something does not look right, report it through *[state reporting channel]*.

Partners and Allies

Election protection advocacy organizations and other civil society groups will have polling-place lookup tools and provide voter education on where and how voters can cast a ballot. Key validators will seek media appearances to reject false rumors and point voters to trusted sources of information, primarily state and local election officials. Election protection groups will likely circulate recommended talking points.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

 Advance Preparation to Consider	
• Publicizing one authoritative website where voters can confirm when, where, and how to vote.	• Establishing a rapid communications channel linking the AG's office, the chief election official, the governor's office, and local election offices.
• Pre-drafting voting-information corrections in the state's most commonly used languages.	• Ensuring after-hours staff can publish urgent updates on official channels.

- How will the AG's office quickly confirm the correct voting or safety information with the official who has direct knowledge?

- *How do state and local election officials communicate information about the locations of polling places and ballot drop boxes?*
- *If there is an emergency or temporary location change, how is that information communicated?*

- How will state and local officials approve and publish updated information for voters in response to threats and misinformation while avoiding conflicting statements?

- How will the AG's office explain a real but localized disruption without giving voters elsewhere the impression that voting is dangerous or has stopped?

- Which community groups and civil society organizations does the AG's office expect to learn from regarding newly arising voter questions, confusion, or access issues?

- To which AI, cybersecurity, and physical security experts can the AG's office refer media for background on relevant threats?

Resources

- [Election Season Communication Guidance for State and Local Officials](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Guidance on proactive communications, rumor response, trusted messengers, and public reassurance.
- [Five Simple Website Fixes That Build Voter Confidence Before November](#) — **States United Democracy Center and U.S. Digital Response**. Recommends practical improvements to official election websites to help voters find accurate information quickly.
- [Contingency Planning](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. “Continuity of Operations Plan” templates, incident-communications materials, and disaster-preparation guidance.
- [Election-Security Resources](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. Resources addressing bomb threats, swatting, site assessments, personal security, and emergency response.
- [Voting Rights: Know Your Rights](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Plain-language guidance on polling places, identification, provisional ballots, accommodations, intimidation, and assistance.
- [Protecting Voters from Intimidation](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Overview of protections against intimidating conduct.
- [Online Voter Suppression: A Guide for Election Officials on How to Spot and Counter It](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. A practical guide to identifying and countering online content that could discourage voting, including false information about dates, deadlines, polling places, long lines, and election security.
- [Artificial Intelligence and Election Administration](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Federal resources on AI-enabled impersonation, false voting information, phishing, and election security.
- [AI Toolkit for Election Officials](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Threat assessment, communications guidance, and templates for election offices.
- [Emerging Technology, AI, and Elections](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Recommendations on planning, tabletop exercises, trusted sources, and basic cybersecurity.

- [Artificial Intelligence and the 2024 Election: Suggestions for Election Officials](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Steps for staff training, impersonation prevention, content authentication, and voter communications.
- [Does AI Fight or Fuel Election Disinformation?](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Tests popular AI tools' ability to counter election falsehoods, create deceptive content, and identify AI-generated media.
- [How Artificial Intelligence Influences Elections and What We Can Do About It](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Overview of deepfakes, AI-enabled voter suppression, and risks to election administration.
- [Countdown to the Midterms: The Changing AI Threat Landscape for Elections](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Assesses 2026 risks arising from broader AI use, weakening voluntary guardrails, changing political incentives, and reduced platform safeguards.
- [When the Algorithmic Odds Are Not in Your Favor: Algorithmic Poisoning and the 2026 U.S. Midterms](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Explains efforts to seed fabricated material into the information systems used by search engines and AI chatbots.
- [Election Integrity Recommendations for Generative AI Developers](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Offers policy, product, and enforcement recommendations addressing voice cloning, voter suppression, deceptive election content, and inaccurate answers to election questions.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., official state election website, voter-information page, multilingual voting guidance, and incident-reporting contact.*

3. Interference with Voter Rolls

Federal Attempts to Obtain Voters' Private Information

The Threat

DOJ continues to unlawfully seek states' complete voter files, including voters' dates of birth, driver's-license information, and partial Social Security numbers—even as courts reject the current administration's legal theories. So far, states have prevailed in every case. Nevertheless, DOJ has appealed dismissals of suits targeting [Pennsylvania](#) and [New Hampshire](#), while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit [declined to fast-track the administration's voter-roll appeals](#). Centralizing sensitive voter data outside established state protections could expose voters to privacy and security risks and facilitate haphazard federal data-matching and pressure to remove eligible voters from the rolls. Even as the administration continues to lose its civil suits seeking voter information, it could pivot to targeting other sources of voter information (e.g., local election officials) or seek to subpoena voter rolls pursuant to bogus criminal investigations.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Make clear that this is a fight to protect voters and election security—not a disagreement over whether voter rolls should be accurate.*

- When voters register, they trust the state to protect their private information. We intend to keep that trust.
- The Trump administration is demanding voters' sensitive personal information—including driver's-license numbers and partial Social Security numbers—that it has no right to collect.
- Court after court has rejected these demands. The administration should stop trying to bully states into surrendering information they are entrusted to protect.
- Building a federal database filled with Americans' personal information would not make our elections safer. It would create new opportunities for misuse, mistakes, and security breaches.
- We will protect voter privacy, defend the states' constitutional role in administering elections, and make sure this fight does not interfere with eligible Americans' ability to vote.

Partners and Allies

State and local advocacy organizations are likely to file litigation to stop attempts to obtain voters' sensitive personal information. Local election offices may receive separate requests and need to respond in concert with state officials. Local offices may even be pressured to run their voter rolls through the administration's SAVE database.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which community organizations and civil society groups in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- What should election officials, contractors, or vendors do if they receive new federal demands or subpoenas for voter information?

- *Have the AG's office and chief election official issued guidance in advance to local election officials, administrators, and vendors?*
- *Whom should election officials and vendors contact if the federal government comes directly to them demanding information?*

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, local election officials, and state cybersecurity officials keep their responses consistent?

- What will voters hear about the state's effort to protect their information and why the dispute does not affect their right to vote?

- *Has the state's chief election official issued guidance or voter-education materials on voter list maintenance and the information that can and cannot be obtained by various parties?*
- *How do state and local election officials communicate with voters?*

Resources

• [Tracker of Justice Department Requests for Voter Information](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Updated state-by-state tracker of federal requests, lawsuits, dismissals, disclosures, and related developments.

- [Federal Courts Reject Trump Administration’s Attempts to Obtain Private Voter Information](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Overview of decisions rejecting DOJ’s voter-data demands.
- [Five Ways the Trump Administration Is Targeting State Voter Rolls](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Overview of federal data demands, SAVE expansion, threats, and investigations.
- [Search Warrants for Election Materials](#) — **Edley Center on Law & Democracy**. Provides election-specific guidance for reviewing and narrowing search warrants to reduce disruption and protect public confidence.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.
- [What’s Breaking Through About the Justice Department’s Election Investigations](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Tested messages addressing voter privacy, state authority, and election security.
- [Federal Engagement with State and Local Election Offices](#) — **Democracy Forward**. Investigation into federal contacts with local election offices, voter-data demands, and contemplated subpoenas.
- [Rapid-Response Legal Support for Local Election Officials](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Description of legal and technical assistance for officials confronting litigation, federal demands, and election interference.
- [How Federal Efforts to Access Voter Data Affect Our Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Democracy](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology, The Leadership Conference’s Center for Civil Rights and Technology, and Protect Democracy**. Explains sensitive information in voter files, federal aggregation efforts, SAVE, the legal landscape, and risks from misuse, exposure, or exploitation.
- [Common Concern: Americans Worried About Personal Data Held by Public Agencies and Want Government Accountability](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Presents nationally representative polling on concern about government-held personal information and sharing for law- and immigration-enforcement purposes.
- [Sharing the Facts About Federal Efforts to Compile State Voter Data](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Factual and communications guidance concerning federal efforts to aggregate state voter data.

- State-Specific Resources — Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state voter-file confidentiality statute, data dictionary, records-retention policy, and written disclosure guidance.

Federal Pressure to Alter or “Clean” Voter Rolls

The Threat

The Trump administration continues to pressure states to identify and remove purportedly ineligible voters using unreliable federal and commercial data that may have little to do with an individual voter’s current eligibility. A federal court has required the expanded SAVE citizenship-verification system to [remain suspended](#), and the former Secretary of State of Texas—a state usually aligned with the current administration—[raised concerns about the reliability of the SAVE system’s citizenship information](#). Despite these concerns, DOJ has [threatened state officials with prosecution](#) if they do not purge their voter rolls.

Key Messages

- Accurate voter rolls protect eligible voters’ rights. Accuracy means removing records when the evidence requires it—not bowing to partisan and self-serving demands from the Trump administration.
- The Trump administration wants states to deny the right to vote first and ask questions later.
- Our state will follow the law, review reliable evidence, give voters fair notice, and correct mistakes before they cost eligible Americans their right to vote.

Partners and Allies

State and local advocacy organizations are likely to file litigation to stop attempts to improperly purge voters from the rolls or remove voters during the “quiet period” under the National Voter Registration Act. Local election offices may receive requests or additional pressure to remove voters. Local offices may even be pressured to run their voter rolls through the administration’s SAVE database.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- Does the AG’s office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will your state respond to federal demands and purported evidence requiring removal of voters from the rolls?

- *Has the AG's office worked with the state's chief election official on a coordinated response to federal demands for removal of voters?*

- How will the state ensure local election officials are acting in accordance with the state's approach?

- *What are the list maintenance procedures in your state? When can voters be removed? For what reasons can they be removed?*
- *What guidance has the state's chief election official provided to local election offices on voter list maintenance procedures?*

- What will potentially affected voters hear about their status, their rights, and how to correct a mistake?

- *How can voters provide information to confirm eligibility before being removed from voter rolls?*
- *Will voters be contacted if they're on the list to be removed?*
- *Have state election officials issued guidance or voter education materials on re-registering to vote?*

- Which community organizations and other partners does the AG's office expect to assist potentially affected voters or provide useful information to state officials?

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *If voters are placed on an inactive list or removed from the rolls, what organizations can help voters re-register?*

Resources

- [Watch Out for False Voter-Fraud Claims Fueled by the SAVE Program](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Explanation of SAVE's limitations, common errors, and potential misuse.

- [Five Ways the Trump Administration Is Targeting State Voter Rolls](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Overview of federal efforts to control voter-list maintenance and use sensitive data for enforcement or removals.
- [What's Breaking Through About False Claims of Noncitizen Voting](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Tested messages for addressing concerns about eligibility and citizenship.
- [Federal Judge Shuts Down Voter-Purge Database](#) — **Democracy Forward**. Summary of litigation against federal aggregation of personal data for voter-list investigations.
- [Federal Court Rejects Request to Pause Ruling Blocking Expanded SAVE System](#) — **Democracy Forward**. Litigation update addressing bulk searches, Social Security data, and inaccurate results.
- [Federal Laws Protecting Against Intimidation and Election Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Includes National Voter Registration Act protections against improper systematic removals.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.
- [How Federal Efforts to Access Voter Data Affect Our Privacy, Civil Liberties, and Democracy](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology, The Leadership Conference's Center for Civil Rights and Technology, and Protect Democracy**. Connects federal voter-data acquisition with efforts to repurpose SAVE as a national voter- and citizenship-verification tool.
- [DHS's Unreliable SAVE System Can No Longer Be Used to Purge Voter Rolls](#) — **Democracy 2025**. Long-form explainer on the ruling blocking use of the expanded SAVE system for voter-roll purges.
- [Sharing the Facts About Federal Efforts to Compile State Voter Data](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Guidance connecting federal voter-data collection to possible citizenship matching and voter removals.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state list-maintenance manual, notice-and-cure procedures, eligibility-review requirements, and relevant statutory deadlines.*

Mass Challenges to Voter Rolls

⚠ Early Warning Signs ⚠	
• Local offices receive identical challenges submitted in large batches, unsubstantiated by specific evidence of ineligibility.	• Challenged voters are concentrated in particular communities or demographic groups.
• One person submits multiple, possibly hundreds or thousands, of challenges.	• Officials receive demands to resolve large challenge lists close to an election.

The Threat

Private activists and allies of the current administration have pursued large-scale challenges in attempt to remove eligible voters from the rolls. Before and after the 2024 election, President [Trump’s allies sought mass purges of voter rolls in battleground states](#). Similar efforts in 2026 could divert local officials from election preparation, overwhelm established review processes, and subject eligible voters to challenges based on incomplete, outdated, or non-individualized information.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Keep the focus on the citizens whose rights are being put in doubt and the evidence the law requires.*

- Every eligible citizen has the right to vote. Private groups with partisan aims can’t undermine that right with flimsy allegations.
- Mass registration challenges can overwhelm local offices at the very moment officials should be preparing to serve voters.
- A challenge does not cut off a voter’s right to participate in the election. Eligible voters will have the opportunity to respond to credible challenges.

Partners and Allies

State and local nonprofit and advocacy organizations may be tracking large-scale voter challenges, or challenges impacting particular communities. They are likely to file litigation to stop significant attempts to improperly challenge voters. These entities may also be providing education to voters on what to do if their registration is challenged and engaging with voters to help them respond to challenges and participate in the election.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the AG's office, the chief election official, and affected localities coordinate when large batches of voter challenges arrive?

- *What guidance has the state's chief election official provided to local election offices on the challenge process and mass challenges?*
- *Are local election officials required to notify the state's chief election official when there are mass challenges?*
- *What guidance is being provided to polling locations for voters who appear on a challenged voter list?*

- What added staffing, administrative, or language-access assistance may local offices need to keep serving voters in the face of mass challenges?

- What will challenged voters hear about what the challenge means and how they can respond?

- *What voter education is being provided to voters if they are challenged?*
- *How do they respond to the challenge?*
- *Can they still vote? How?*

- Which community organizations or other civil society groups might assist voters who have been wrongfully challenged and how will those organizations receive accurate information?

- *What guidance is the AG's office providing that might help partner organizations to assist wrongfully challenged voters?*
- *How can these organizations provide the AG's office with additional information about challenges?*

Resources

- [Protecting Americans from Mass Voter Challenges](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Guidance on unreliable mass-challenge methods, individualized evidence, notice, and fair review procedures.
- [Federal Laws Protecting Against Intimidation and Election Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. National Voter Registration Act protections applicable to mass challenges and removals.
- [Guide to Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Addresses mass challenges, door-to-door canvassing, online targeting, and legal protections.
- [Rapid-Response Legal Support for Local Election Officials](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Describes assistance available to local officials responding to voter challenges, ballot disputes, and voter-suppression litigation.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state voter-challenge law, hearing procedures.*

4. Pre-Election Interference with Election Materials or Procedures

Refusal to Deliver Mail Ballots to Voters

The Threat

The Trump administration has attempted to direct USPS to deliver mail ballots only to voters appearing on federally compiled “state citizenship lists.” USPS proposed rules that would require states to provide voter information and new ballot identifiers before the agency delivered election mail. The administration’s attempt to curtail voting by mail was initially enjoined by a federal district court but has been subject to [ongoing litigation](#). Further federal action or USPS operational changes could prevent eligible voters from receiving their ballots or create widespread uncertainty about whether those ballots will be delivered.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Lead with the voter’s right to receive a ballot and give practical next steps.*

- Eligible voters in [your state] have a right to vote by mail. They should not lose their voices because the federal government disrupts the mail or invents new and unlawful barriers to receiving a ballot.
- The Postal Service’s job is to deliver the mail, including ballots to voters eligible under state law. USPS does not get to pick and choose who has the right to vote.
- We are watching delivery, pressing USPS to fix problems quickly, and protecting lawful options for voters whose ballots do not arrive.
- Request and return your ballot early, track it when you can through [official website], and contact your local election office immediately if something is wrong.

Partners and Allies

State and national advocacy organizations may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal overreach or failure of USPS to deliver the mail. Organizations may also track delays in mail voting reported by voters to voter protection hotlines and can provide additional information on problems with the mail. Election protection and civil rights organizations are also likely to provide voter education resources on how to obtain and return mail ballots, including by dropping ballots off at local election offices or using drop

boxes as appropriate in particular jurisdictions. Election protection groups will likely circulate recommended talking points.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, and local election offices coordinate when a USPS delivery problem emerges?

- *What guidance has been provided to local election offices on contacting local postal service election mail coordinators?*
 - *When should local officials escalate the issue to the state?*
 - *If escalated, does the AG's office or chief election official have relationships with postal service election mail coordinators?*
- *Is the AG's office, or the state's chief election official, in regular contact with USPS liaisons? Has the AG's office considered strengthening coordination with those liaisons to ensure election officials are aware in advance of good-faith issues that may cause delays?*
- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local postal unions?*

- What will voters hear about replacement ballots, lawful return options, tracking, deadlines, and alternatives to voting by mail—and where will the AG's office direct voters for up-to-date information?

- *How do state and local election officials communicate with voters? Can they text voters updates? Do they have social media accounts or websites that share information on voting locations and return methods, including drop boxes?*
- *Can voters track their mail ballot? How?*
- *Does the AG's office have a plan in place to communicate to voters the results of any further litigation or court rulings regarding federal efforts to limit voting by mail and what those results mean for them?*

- How will local officials receive consistent instructions while litigation is ongoing or postal operations remain unsettled?

- *Does the AG's office have a communication plan for local election officials and local law enforcement?*
- *What guidance or resources can the AG's office provide before and after a relevant court order?*
- *Does the AG's office have a plan in place to communicate to local officials the results of any further litigation or court rulings regarding federal efforts to limit voting by mail and what those results mean for them?*

- Which community organizations and civil society groups does the AG's office expect will assist voters to find the best way to cast their ballots and alert the AG's office to emerging issues?

- *What voter education or polling location information will the AG's office share with community organizations and interested members of the public?*
- *If there are changes to return methods, or recommendations to return a mail ballot in person or by drop box, how will that be communicated to relevant community organizations and interested members of the public?*
- *How do the AG's office and the chief election official expect to respond if community organizations report mail-ballot delays?*

Resources

- [The Trump Administration's Three-Part Attack on Mail Voting](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Overview of federal-list proposals, ballot-receipt deadlines, and mail-voting disinformation.
- [Trump Mail-In Voting Executive Order Challenge \(DSCC\)](#) — **Democracy Docket**. Tracks the consolidated challenge brought by political party organizations, public officials, and voting-rights organizations against the March 2026 executive order's mail-voting, citizenship-registry, and election-administration provisions.
- [Trump Mail-In Voting Executive Order Challenge \(State AGs\)](#) — **Democracy Docket**. Tracks the state-led challenge to the March 2026 executive order, including the June 25 ruling blocking its implementation in the plaintiff jurisdictions and the Trump administration's subsequent appeals and emergency stay requests.
- [Can State Prohibitions on Election Interference Constrain Federal Actors?](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Examines how state election laws may constrain federal officials who interfere with polling places, mail voting, ballots, voting equipment, or other state election processes.
- [Dates for 2026 Early In-Person and Mail Voting](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. State-by-state voting timelines and deadlines.

- [The Benefits of Pre-Processing Mail Ballots](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. Overview of secure mail-ballot validation and preparation.
- [Defending Vote by Mail from the Trump Administration’s Unconstitutional Executive Overreach](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Case background and legal framing concerning federal interference with mail voting.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., official ballot-request deadlines, ballot-tracking system, replacement-ballot instructions, and authorized return options.*

Federal Directives Purporting to Change Election Rules

The Threat

President Trump has issued executive orders purporting to impose new requirements on voter registration, citizenship documentation, voting equipment, receipt of ballots by mail, and other state election procedures. Federal courts have [blocked substantial portions of those directives as exceeding presidential authority](#), while [litigation over proposed vote-by-mail restrictions persists](#). Additional executive orders or other federal pronouncements could create confusion and pressure local officials to deviate from established procedures before courts determine whether those directives are lawful.

Key Messages

- Our election rules are set by law—not rewritten at the last minute by the White House.
- The President cannot unilaterally hijack election procedures that the Constitution entrusts to the states. Federal courts have already rejected this administration’s unlawful election takeover attempts.
- President Trump is creating confusion about the rules on purpose—it makes voting harder and provides a new excuse to attack the results when they don’t go his way.
- Our state will follow the law. Voters and local election officials can trust the rules and procedures established by statute.

Partners and Allies

State and national advocacy organizations may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal overreach. Election protection organizations are also likely to provide voter education resources on how voters can vote in your state. Key validators will seek media

appearances to reassure voters that the President cannot unilaterally change election procedures and point voters to trusted sources of information, primarily state and local election officials. Election protection groups will likely circulate recommended talking points.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- What should local election officials do while the state challenges or reviews the federal directive?

- *What guidance can the AG's office or the chief election official provide to local election officials in advance of executive orders or actions by the President purporting to interfere with state election processes?*
- *What is the rapid-response communication plan for engaging with local election officials?*

- Who will issue statewide instructions and keep the AG's office, governor, chief election official, and local administrators aligned?

- What will voters hear about the federal announcement, the state's response, and the rules they should follow?

- *How will the AG's office and chief election official coordinate the state's response?*
- *What is the plan for getting information to voters on the continued conduct of the election?*

- How will the AG's office ensure local operations comply with preliminary and final court orders?

- *Does the AG's office have a communication plan for local election officials and local law enforcement?*
- *What guidance or resources can the AG's office share while litigation is ongoing?*

Resources

- [Preparing for Federal Interference in the 2026 Midterm Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Brennan Center for Justice**. Planning guide covering executive orders, voter purges, seizures, and federal deployments.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical

guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.

- [Five Simple Website Fixes That Build Voter Confidence Before November](#) — **States United Democracy Center and U.S. Digital Response**. Recommends practical improvements to official election websites to help voters find accurate information quickly.
- [Executive Override - How the Trump Administration Plans to Interfere with the 2026 Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Integrated explanation of federal election-interference tactics and countermeasures.
- [Resources for State and Local Election Officials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Topic-specific collection addressing federal interference, security, records, equipment, and resiliency.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state election-administration manual, current directives to local officials.*

Pre-Election Seizure of Equipment or Ballots

The Threat

The Trump administration has [cast doubt on the security of voting machines](#), explored the possibility of [banning certain voting equipment](#), and sought access to equipment and confidential information in multiple states. Some experts have worried that the administration could seek to [unilaterally decertify some states' electronic voting machines](#). Federal officials could expand on previous efforts by seeking further access to voting machines, electronic poll books, ballot printers, tabulators, or other materials shortly before voting, potentially leaving jurisdictions without equipment and requiring emergency replacement and testing.

⚠ Early Warning Signs ⚠	
• Federal law enforcement asks for equipment inventories, serial numbers, or storage locations.	• Officials are asked to permit “voluntary” inspection or transfer of equipment.
• Vendors receive requests concerning equipment deployed in the state.	• Administration figures publicly demand seizure or forensic inspection.

Key Messages

- Voters deserve an election that runs securely and makes their voices heard, even when federal officials chase old and discredited claims.

- Seizing the equipment local officials need to run elections does not protect election security. It's another attempt to sow doubt and create confusion.
- The Trump administration cannot use an investigation into the past as an excuse to disable the systems voters need now.
- Our state will continue to do everything in our power to help ensure that this election—and the voting systems we use—are accurate and secure.
- Our state's election officials have prepared for disruption. Voters should continue following official election information available at [*official website*] in making their plans to vote.

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national advocacy groups will likely push back publicly and forcefully against any narrative suggesting that elections are not secure in your state or the targeted jurisdiction. Some may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal overreach, while others may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against federal efforts. Some national groups may offer legal support for local election offices, if they are allowed to accept assistance under state law.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the equipment custodian, local election office, chief election official, AG's office, vendor, and cybersecurity personnel coordinate once access or seizure is sought?

- *What are the notice requirements for vendors once access or seizure is sought?*
- *What guidance has been provided to local election offices, equipment custodians, and vendors on communicating with the AG's office and chief election official?*
- *Has the AG's office provided election officials with guidance about the different kinds of authority federal agents may invoke to try to seize documents or equipment or to obtain information (e.g., voluntary request, administrative subpoena, judicial warrant, grand jury subpoena) and how the officials' response options in how to respond to each may differ in each circumstance?*
- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*

- *Has the AG's office considered outreach to magistrate judges in your state to ensure they know that the state would seek to participate in a two-party hearing before the seizure of voting materials?*

- How will state and local officials coordinate to allow voting to continue if some equipment becomes unavailable?

- *What backup equipment is available?*
- *How is equipment distributed if there are seizures across multiple local jurisdictions?*

- How will the equipment be inspected, tested, or recertified before it is used again?

- What will the public hear about the incident, without suggesting that seizure proves wrongdoing or jeopardizes election results?

Resources

- [How Election Officials Respond to Law-Enforcement Requests for Access to Election Equipment and Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Explains authority over equipment and ballots, legal process, custody obligations, and consequences of outside access.
- [Preparing for Law-Enforcement Demands for Election Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Practical recommendations for officials, law enforcement, grand juries, and courts.
- [Search Warrants for Election Materials](#) — **Edley Center on Law & Democracy**. Provides election-specific guidance for reviewing and narrowing search warrants to reduce disruption and protect public confidence.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.
- [Can State Prohibitions on Election Interference Constrain Federal Actors?](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Examines how state election laws may constrain federal officials who interfere with polling places, mail voting, ballots, voting equipment, or other state election processes.
- [Preparing for Federal Interference in the 2026 Midterm Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Brennan Center for Justice**. Planning guidance for possible federal seizures of voting systems and records.
- [Election Technology Resources](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Testing, certification, access-control, and system-security resources.

- [Contingency Planning](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. “Continuity of Operations Plan” template and guidance for maintaining operations when equipment becomes unavailable.
- [FAQ: Voting System Vulnerabilities and How They Can Be Weaponized](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Useful for explaining why discovery of a vulnerability does not itself show exploitation or an unreliable election result.
- [No Simple Answers: A Primer on Ballot-Marking Device Security](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Explains legitimate ballot-marking-device security concerns, accessibility benefits, safeguards, and the difference between technical issues and unsupported claims.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., ballot- and equipment-custody requirements, retention schedules, inventory forms, chain-of-custody requirements, and emergency procedures.*

Federal Interference with Third-Party Election Vendors

The Threat

Trump administration officials have explored federal action against voting equipment manufactured by Dominion and sought access to confidential election records and machines. Reuters has reported that an administration official [sought a potential federal basis for excluding Dominion systems used across the country](#). Federal officials have also [sought ballots](#) and access to [voting machines](#) at county election offices in the hope of substantiating conspiracy theories about the outcome of the 2020 election. Rather than directly targeting state and local officials, the administration could also attempt to obtain access to voting equipment or data through vendors and contractors on which state and local governments rely to provide essential equipment and services.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Make clear that a vendor does not control the state’s election.*

- State and local governments administer elections—not private companies and certainly not the President.
- The Trump administration is trying to get confidential information and election-equipment access that it has no right to.

- We will continue to protect voters' information, maintain critical services, and make sure we are ready to run a fair and secure election, free from unlawful federal interference.

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national groups will likely push back publicly and forcefully against any narrative suggesting that elections are not secure in your state or the targeted jurisdiction. They will push back against claims that voting machines are not secure. Some may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal overreach and attempts to access confidential voter information from vendors. Other organizations may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against federal efforts.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the relevant vendors or contractors, affected election officials, AG's office, and chief election official coordinate after a federal demand to obtain information or materials from an election vendor or contractor?

- *Do vendors have a duty to inform a state or local agency if materials or information are demanded or seized? Who is entitled to be informed and how?*
- *Does the AG's office have a communication plan in place to receive information from the vendor or state or local agency?*
- *What guidance can the AG's office or the chief election official provide to election workers and vendors in advance about the removal of election materials?*

- How will critical election services continue if a vendor's staff, systems, records, equipment, or technical support becomes unavailable?

- *Are vendors required to have backup equipment or create backups of records?*

- What will local officials hear about affected services and approved alternatives?

- What will voters hear in response to concerns that election systems have been compromised?

Resources

- [Clearinghouse Resources on Election Technology](#) — U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Best practices for procuring, maintaining, testing, certifying, and securing election technology.

- [Resources for State and Local Election Officials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Specific guidance on equipment access, insider risks, cyberattacks, technical failures, and resiliency.
- [Search Warrants for Election Materials](#) — **Edley Center on Law & Democracy**. Provides election-specific guidance for reviewing and narrowing search warrants to reduce disruption and protect public confidence.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.
- [Contingency Planning](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. “Continuity of Operations Plan” template and tools for loss of essential capabilities or services.
- [Election Subversion: The 2024 Election and Recommendations to Address Vulnerabilities](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Broader analysis of vulnerabilities affecting election systems and administration.
- [A Fractured Shield: Changes to Cyber Information Sharing Put Elections at Risk](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Explains the distinct visibility of state officials, local election offices, vendors, and other partners and why rapid cybersecurity information-sharing across the ecosystem matters.
- [Countdown to the Midterms: Mapping the Rapid Evolution of Election Security](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Examines weakened federal election-security support, reduced incident-response capacity, and the need to rebuild state, local, and private-sector partnerships.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., critical-vendor inventory; relevant contracts and provisions governing subpoenas, confidentiality, incident notices, data security, and emergency support.*

5. Threats, Harassment, and Intimidation of Election Officials, Poll Workers, and Civil Society Organizations

Bogus Federal Investigations or Indictments

The Threat

DOJ and the FBI have used subpoenas, warrants, and substantial investigative resources to revisit allegations concerning the 2020 election, including the seizure of Fulton County election materials and a demand for personal information about its election workers. In July 2026, a federal judge [quashed DOJ’s demand for election workers’ personal information as unreasonable and described its scope as “staggering”](#). Similarly, DOJ has threatened state election officials with criminal liability while pressing them to surrender voter data or change voter-list practices. In July 2026, the department [sent letters to officials in all 50 states and the District of Columbia warning of possible prosecution related to noncitizen voting](#). Investigations lacking a legitimate factual basis, or extending vastly beyond the scope of any alleged wrongdoing, could burden current election operations, expose workers to harassment, create a misleading appearance of wrongdoing, and pressure officials to alter lawful practices.

⚠ Early Warning Signs ⚠	
• Public allegations precede investigative contact, frequently via social media and through local election-denier networks.	• Requests seek broad personal information unrelated to a defined allegation.
• Federal agents contact workers individually rather than through the election office.	• Multiple jurisdictions receive similar requests simultaneously.
• Investigators rely on claims rejected by audits, courts, or earlier investigations.	• Officials receive unusually broad preservation demands or subpoenas.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: Do not let the existence of an investigation validate the allegations behind it. Defend legitimate law enforcement while calling out abuse of investigative power.

- Law-enforcement power should protect free and fair elections—not manufacture suspicion, undermine confidence in our processes, or punish public servants for doing their jobs.
- The Trump administration is using subpoenas, searches, and investigations to breathe new life into claims that courts, audits, and prior reviews rejected long ago.
- The Justice Department is threatening election officials while pressuring them to abandon lawful state election procedures.
- These tactics can drain resources from the current election, expose workers to harassment, and create the false impression of wrongdoing where none exists.
- Our office has worked ceaselessly with state and local officials to ensure that our elections are secure, every eligible voter can cast a ballot, and every vote is accurately counted.
- We will investigate credible allegations of wrongdoing.
- What we will not do is to allow our election workers to be threatened or abused, false information to be amplified and weaponized, or eligible voters to be intimidated.
- We stand with our local election officials and the voters of our state to affirm what the Constitution requires: We Americans choose our leaders, not the other way around.

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national advocacy groups will likely push back publicly and forcefully against any narrative suggesting that elections are not secure in your state or the targeted jurisdiction. Some may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal overreach, while others may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against federal efforts. Some national groups may offer legal support for local election offices, where state law permits them to accept such assistance.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- What support can the AG's office provide to local election officials in advance of any federal investigation?

- *See linked resources below for model guidance that can be tailored to specific state laws.*
- *Does your state law allow for direct representation of local jurisdictions?*

- What staffing, security, communications, or organizational support may a targeted official or jurisdiction need?

- *Does the AG's office have jurisdiction over law enforcement agencies?*
- *Has the AG's office issued guidance to law enforcement agencies related to the security of election offices?*
- *What resources can the AG's office share?*

- What will the public hear about the difference between an investigation and proof of wrongdoing?

- *Has the AG's office already developed talking points to use in response to potential bad-faith investigations?*

Resources

- [Preparing for Law-Enforcement Demands for Election Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Guidance on scrutinizing warrants, subpoenas, and criminal investigative demands.
- [How Election Officials Respond to Law-Enforcement Requests for Access to Election Equipment and Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Explains when access may be compelled and why improper access creates legal and security risks.
- [What's Breaking Through About the Trump Administration's 2020 Election Investigation](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Tested communications for responding to renewed federal investigations.
- [Federal Engagement with State and Local Election Offices](#) — **Democracy Forward**. Records and analysis concerning federal investigations, local voter-data demands, and potential subpoenas.
- [Rapid-Response Legal Support for Local Election Officials](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Describes direct legal representation, technical assistance, and coalition support for local officials.
- [Nonprofit Toolkit: Responding to Government Investigations](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Operational and legal preparation for organizations facing government investigations.
- [Democracy Protection Network: Request Services](#) — **Democracy Protection Network**. Application for legal and related assistance.

- State-Specific Resources — Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., contact information for appropriate legal representation.

Threats or Incitement by Federal Officials

The Threat

President Trump and his allies have repeatedly characterized election officials and workers as corrupt or criminal, and election workers have expressed fears over [death threats, racist abuse, doxing, and harassment directed at election personnel and their families](#). Federal officials could heighten those risks by [singling out individual administrators](#), judges, advocates, or civic organizations in speeches, social-media posts, or official communications. Even without an explicit call for violence, identifying a public servant as an enemy, criminal, or election thief can predictably expose that person and their family to threats.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: Do not repeat threats or expose targeted workers unnecessarily. Center the people doing the work and the responsibility of powerful speakers.

- Election workers are our neighbors and public servants. They should be thanked for protecting the vote—not turned into political targets.
- When powerful officials call an election worker corrupt, criminal, or an enemy, they know what can follow: threats, harassment, and fear for that worker’s family.
- Criticism is protected. Threatening or intimidating someone for doing lawful election work is not.
- We will protect targeted officials, preserve evidence, coordinate with law enforcement, and hold people accountable when they cross the line.
- Our election workers will keep doing their jobs, and the state will stand behind them.

Partners and Allies

Local organizations’ responses to threats will vary, depending on the nature of the threat. They will likely balance the need to support local officials while avoiding the amplification of specific threats. Should the federal government openly target specific individual administrators or officials, advocacy organizations will likely condemn these actions and offer legal representation for the targeted administrator. High-level threats or incitement may trigger organizing, peaceful protests, and increased presence of community members outside of polling places.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office have contact information for election offices in your state's political subdivisions? How will the AG's office coordinate with your chief election official in response to federal threats or incitement?*
- *Have local election officials received training on swatting, doxing, and similar threats? Have they been advised to reach out to their local law enforcement offices in advance of, or during, any event, to the extent possible?*
- *Does the AG's office have direct contact information for local law enforcement?*
- *Have resources been provided to local law enforcement regarding potential threats to election officials and poll workers?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the targeted official or organization, the AG's office, election officials, and public-safety agencies coordinate once a target is identified?

- *Is this an appropriate situation to respond in coordination with your state's chief election officer and/or governor?*

- What staffing, transportation, security, communications, or other support will help the target continue lawful election work?

- *Are there plans to surge state employees into jurisdictions to serve as temporary election workers as needed?*
- *Is there funding available to have additional security deployed in key jurisdictions without causing public alarm?*
- *Do targeted jurisdictions have crisis communications specialists available?*

- What will other state and local officials and the public hear about potential threats, without repeating the threatening rhetoric or exposing more personal information?

- *Have communications staff pre-drafted statements that can be quickly deployed?*

- Which nonprofit or professional partners that can assist targets of threats or harassment will receive information (with the target's consent), and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about related threats or support needs?

- *Are these relationships already established? Have key emergency contacts already been identified?*

Resources

- [Threats to Election Officials: Informational Guide for Law Enforcement](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Guidance on prevention, reporting, investigation, coordination, and support for targeted officials.
- [Guide to Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Detailed analysis of intimidating conduct and available legal tools.
- [Federal Laws Protecting Against Intimidation and Election Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Federal civil and criminal protections for voters and election personnel.
- [Protecting and Securing Voter Participation: Takeaways from the 2024 Presidential Election](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Analysis of intimidation reports and recommendations for state and local officials.
- [Responding to Election Harassment: How to Build a Security Task Force](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Framework for creating a year-round task force, coordinating with law enforcement, assigning roles, and exercising scenarios.
- [Election-Security and Personal-Safety Resources](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. Law enforcement guides, personal security, threat response, swatting, and site-assessment materials.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., contact information for appropriate law enforcement officials.*

6. Physical Interference, Intimidation, or Violence at Polling Places and Ballot Dropoff Locations

Deployment of Federal Forces: ICE, CBP, Military, Federalized National Guard

The Threat

The Trump administration has threatened expanded federal involvement in elections, while federal officials have offered shifting assurances about immigration agents near polling places. States and community organizations are now planning for the possibility that federal personnel could appear near polling locations before courts resolve challenges to their authority. States are [enacting legislation to safeguard elections against federal interference](#), organizers have begun [training election observers because of concern about troops or ICE at the polls](#), and a Lawfare analysis warns of a potential “[deploy first, litigate later](#)” [approach to involving the military in elections](#). A visible deployment, checkpoint, nearby enforcement operation, or threat of deployment could intimidate eligible voters and suppress participation while the state seeks judicial relief.

⚠ Early Warning Signs ⚠	
• Federal agencies request polling-place or drop-box maps or other operational information.	• The administration invokes emergency, public-safety, immigration, or military authority without identifying a concrete election-related threat.
• Federal operations are announced near voting locations shortly before or during voting.	• Community organizations report that voters fear approaching election sites.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: Do not heighten fear or inadvertently discourage voting. Lead with voters’ freedom, the limits on federal power, and the state’s readiness to protect voting access.

- In our state, eligible voters have the right to cast a ballot free from interference.
- We know the law, we are prepared, and we will act to protect voters and election officials.

- The Trump administration cannot use ICE, troops, or other federal agents to take over an election run by the state.
- Putting immigration agents near polling places would not protect our election. It would make participation by eligible voters harder.
- Do not let empty threats from Washington silence your voice. Check official election information available at [*official website*], make a plan to vote, and report any attempted intimidation immediately.

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national advocacy groups will be tracking any immigration enforcement areas in their communities. They will likely push back publicly and forcefully against any narrative suggesting that elections are not secure in your state or the targeted jurisdiction or that large numbers of noncitizens are attempting to vote. They will emphasize that noncitizen voting is extremely rare. Some may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal overreach, while others may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against federal efforts.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local immigrant rights organizations?*
- *Does the AG's office have relationships with the ICE/CBP leadership in your state and your National Guard unit leadership?*
- *Does the AG's office have relationships with local election office counsel?*
- *Have county election offices received guidance on federal presence at or near polling locations?*
- *Does the AG's office know where ICE/CBP is planning to do regular or scheduled staging around the time of the election? If those locations are near polling sites, can the AG's office ask local ICE/CBP leadership to move or delay those stagings (assuming they appear **not** for the purpose of voter intimidation)?*
- *Has the AG's office published guidance on state law related to voter access and voter intimidation?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, governor, local officials, and public-safety leaders coordinate if federal personnel appear near a voting location?

- *Does your state have a plan to connect key personnel from these offices on Election Day? Who from the AG's office will be involved?*

- How will voters continue to enter the location, or an alternative location, and cast ballots safely?

- *Can voters vote at a different location during early voting or on Election Day?*
- *Does the AG's office have jurisdiction over law enforcement agencies? Has the AG's office developed a plan with local law enforcement to ensure access to polling locations?*

- What will voters hear about the status of the affected location, their rights, and the help available to them?

- *Does your state's chief election official have a publicly available polling location lookup tool?*
- *Do county election offices have a polling location lookup tool?*
- *What resources can the AG's office and election officials share to update voters?*

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about access problems or community concerns?

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local immigrant rights and voter protection organizations?*
- *What guidance or resources can the AG's office share to protect First Amendment speech by organizers?*
- *How will the AG's office hear of problems from local immigrant rights and civil rights organizations?*

- How will any court order limiting federal activity reach the officials and officers responsible for carrying it out?

- *Does the AG's office have a communication plan for local election officials and local law enforcement?*
- *What guidance or resources can the AG's office share before and after a court order is issued?*

Resources

- [Preventing Voter Intimidation by Federal Agents at the Polls](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Explains legal protections against armed federal agents at election sites and how officials and civil society can respond while keeping voting underway.

- [Federal Agents at the Polls: Know Your Rights](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Guidance on federal agents, immigration enforcement, military personnel, observers, intimidation, and voter rights.
- [Early Warning Advisory: Assessing the Risk of Federal Immigration Agent Deployments to Polls](#) — **Bridging Divides Initiative**. Assesses risks from federal immigration agents, state or local law enforcement, and nearby immigration operations affecting voter access, intimidation, and election processes.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.
- [Can State Prohibitions on Election Interference Constrain Federal Actors?](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Examines how state election laws may constrain federal officials who interfere with polling places, mail voting, ballots, voting equipment, or other state election processes.
- [State and Territorial Laws Governing the National Guard](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Compiles state and territorial laws governing National Guard deployments, law-enforcement powers, and domestic military activity.
- [Model Bill: State Accountability for Federal Interference in Elections](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Provides model state legislation to deter and address interference or voter intimidation by federal and state officials.
- [Sending ICE to Polling Places Is Illegal](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Explains why deploying ICE or other armed federal agents to election sites would violate federal and state law and how officials can prepare.
- [Community Resilience in the 2026 Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Over Zero**. Communications and community-planning guidance for potential federal deployments.
- [How to Spot and Push Back Against Federal Voter Intimidation](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Scenario guidance involving ICE, federal agents, National Guard personnel, and local cooperation.
- [Preparing for Federal Interference in the 2026 Midterm Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Brennan Center for Justice**. Planning and legal background concerning federal forces and voter intimidation.
- [Federal Laws Protecting Against Intimidation and Election Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Federal protections involving government and military personnel.

- [Understanding Local Police, the National Guard, and ICE](#) — **Democracy Security Project**. Operational distinctions among local police, National Guard, and immigration enforcement.
- [Vote Free from Fear 2026](#) — **Southern Poverty Law Center**. Voter-facing safety and rights guidance.
- [Federal Agents at the Polls — Spanish](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Spanish-language companion to the ACLU’s federal-agents guidance.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state operating manuals for polling locations; list of polling locations and alternative/contingency locations.*

Disruptions by Federal or Partisan Poll Watchers

The Threat

DOJ has announced plans to deploy federal election monitors to jurisdictions in multiple states during the 2026 primary season, including in [Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Virginia](#). Federal civil-rights monitoring and lawful partisan observation are established parts of elections, but previous observer-recruitment efforts have featured [instructions to be “aggressive” and prompted concerns about intimidation and disruption](#). Federal or partisan observers could interfere by [questioning voters, directing workers, entering restricted areas, or demanding access](#) that their observer status does not provide.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Do not portray lawful observation as suspicious. Draw a bright line between watching the process and interfering with it.*

- We welcome lawful civil-rights monitoring. We will not allow federal observers to exceed their authority, disrupt election workers, or intimidate voters.
- Observers may watch the process within the rules. They do not run the polling place, question voters, direct workers, or handle ballots.
- A federal badge or partisan credential does not put anyone above the law or polling-place procedures.
- We welcome lawful observation but will act when an observer crosses the line into intimidation, obstruction, or unauthorized access.

- Voters should cast their ballots with confidence. Observers do not decide who may vote or whether a lawful ballot counts.

Partners and Allies

Prepare for the possibility of poll observers or monitors by both political parties as well as nonpartisan efforts. Many community and advocacy organizations may have their own poll monitor programs as well as voter protection hotlines. While these can be a great source of information on the ground, it is important that everyone knows the rules.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Consider working with your chief election official to understand the rules for monitoring during early voting and on Election Day as well as any rules around drop boxes or in-person absentee. Do different access and conduct rules apply to partisan and nonpartisan observers? Who is allowed inside the polling location? Who is allowed outside or inside the electioneering boundary? Do they have to be credentialed? Can they observe the count?*
- *Does the AG's office have contacts within voting rights organizations that plan to deploy monitors or observers?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- What will local election officials and frontline workers be told about the observer's authority and how election work should proceed in the face of disruptions?

- *Has your chief election official released guidance to local election officials on poll monitors/observers? Does it address voter intimidation and electioneering?*
- *What authority do local officials and poll workers have to remove a disruptive person?*
- *Whom should they contact if a situation escalates?*

- How will the state respond if an observer crosses the line into intimidation, obstruction, or unauthorized access?

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *What guidance has the AG's office issued on responding to disruptive or intimidating observers?*

- What will voters hear about the difference between lawful observation and interference?

- *Whom should voters contact if they encounter a disruptive observer?*

- How will the AG's office communicate with community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about recurring conduct or voter concerns?

- *Whom should partners contact to share information from their observer/hotline programs? How should information be escalated?*
- *Will the AG's office provide updates to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public on disruptive behavior or voter concerns?*

Resources

- [Resources on Observers and Transparency](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Poll-watcher guides, transparency checklists, and links to state and local observer rules.
- [Guide to Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Guidance on intimidation by partisan observers and poll watchers.
- [Federal Agents at the Polls: Know Your Rights](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Guidance concerning federal observers who act beyond their proper scope.
- [What Is Voter Intimidation?](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Description of what poll monitors generally may and may not do.
- [Protecting Voters from Intimidation](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Guidance on observer conduct and enforcement of polling-place rules.
- [Model Bill: State Accountability for Federal Interference in Elections](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Provides model state legislation to deter and address interference or voter intimidation by federal and state officials.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., rules regarding poll-watcher credentialing, access, conduct, challenge, and removal; resources provided to poll workers re poll watchers.*

Interference by Rogue Poll Workers or Local Election Officials

The Threat

Organized election-denial groups have recruited supporters to serve as poll workers or obtain local election positions, where an individual could improperly challenge voters, provide false instructions, permit unauthorized access, or interfere with equipment. Most workers serve professionally and safeguards limit what one person can do, but organized

efforts have [trained prospective workers](#) in combative tactics and encouraged them to question routine processes.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Do not suggest that one person controls the election. Explain the safeguards, containment, and accountability in ordinary language.*

- Voters deserve election workers who follow the law—and safeguards strong enough to stop anyone who does not.
- Our state’s election workers overwhelmingly serve professionally and honorably. But being an election official does not give someone permission to misuse voter information, tamper with equipment, or ignore the rules everyone else follows.
- Our elections are built with supervision, access controls, custody requirements, and other checks so one person cannot quietly take over the process.
- If and when issues arise, we will work hard to contain the problem, secure the relevant records, and keep lawful election operations moving.
- We will find out what happened and require accountability—isolated misconduct cannot derail a lawful election.

Partners and Allies

State and local community organizations, civil society groups, and parties may have poll monitors or observers on the ground or hear information through voter protection hotlines regarding improper poll worker behavior. The AG’s office should be prepared for partners to flag potential issues.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG’s office have established relationships with local voting rights organizations?*
- *How will community organizations, civil society groups, or other interested members of the public get information to the AG’s office about rogue poll workers?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the affected election office, chief election official, AG’s office, and relevant technical personnel coordinate after insider misconduct is reported?

- *Has the state’s chief election official or the AG’s office released guidance on how to handle improper poll worker behavior?*

- *What are the procedures for handling voter intimidation by poll workers?*
- How will election work continue while the worker or official is removed, reassigned, or restricted, and what added staffing, supervision, or technical help may the affected jurisdiction need?**
- *What happens if a poll worker/manager is removed or unavailable?*
 - *If voting is temporarily disrupted, what are the procedures for resuming voting and possibly extending hours?*
- What will workers and voters hear about safeguards containing any misconduct that occurred?**
- *Does the AG's office or chief election official have communications guidelines or draft communications addressing rogue poll workers?*
- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about voter concerns?**
- *Whom should these groups contact with information from their observer/hotline programs? How should information be escalated?*

Resources

- [Amici Curiae: Holding Rogue Election Workers Accountable for Misconduct](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Addresses unauthorized extraction of voter information, unapproved devices, voter privacy, insider access, and accountability.
- [Guide to Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Addresses intimidating conduct and misconduct by poll workers.
- [Election Technology Resources](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Guidance on access controls, seals, cameras, testing, and system security.
- [Resources for State and Local Election Officials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Includes specific resources on insider threats and election-security resiliency.
- [Responding to Election Harassment: How to Build a Security Task Force](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Includes scenario planning for overly aggressive observers and other personnel-related disruptions.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., rules regarding poll-worker removal, incident-reporting procedures, poll-worker training materials, backup poll-worker roster.*

Federal Attempts to Co-opt Local Law Enforcement

The Threat

Federal agencies may ask local police or sheriffs to support deployments, investigations, checkpoints, equipment access, or activity affecting voting. Local officials may also act independently on unsupported allegations. For example, in February of 2026, a [California sheriff seized ballots](#) from a completed election. Requests that blur the line between public safety and election administration could place armed officers near voters, disrupt custody of materials, or give federal actors access they would not otherwise possess.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Do not cast suspicion on law enforcement generally. Define the proper public-safety role and the line federal actors may not cross.*

- Law enforcement should protect voters and election workers—not be subjected to political pressure from Washington.
- Law enforcement has a vital role in keeping our communities safe. But it does not decide who may vote, change election rules, or determine how ballots are counted.
- Local agencies should not hand over ballots, equipment, or private voter information without lawful authority and appropriate review by the state’s chief election and legal officials.
- We are working with law enforcement leaders to keep public safety officials focused on safety—and election administration in the hands of election officials.
- Our office has worked ceaselessly with state and local officials to ensure that our elections are secure, every eligible voter can cast their ballot, and every vote is accurately counted.
- We will investigate and disclose every credible allegation of wrongdoing.
- We will not allow our election workers to be threatened or abused, nor voters to be intimidated.
- We stand with our local election officials and the voters of our state to affirm what the Constitution requires: Americans choose our leaders, not the other way around.

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national advocacy groups will likely push back publicly and forcefully against any narrative suggesting that elections are not secure in your state or the targeted

jurisdiction. Some may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal attempts to co-opt law enforcement or independent law enforcement action, while others may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against actions by law enforcement.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, local election administrator, local-government counsel, and law enforcement leaders coordinate if federal officials pressure local law enforcement?

- *During early voting, how will the AG's office, chief election official, local government counsel, and law enforcement leaders inform each other of any federal requests?*
- *Does your state have a plan to connect key personnel from these offices on Election Day? Who from the AG's office will be involved?*

- What will local officers be told about the line between public safety and election administration?

- *See linked resources below for model guidance that can be tailored to specific state laws.*
- *Does your state law allow for direct representation of local jurisdictions?*
- *Does the AG's office have jurisdiction over law enforcement agencies?*
- *Has the AG's office issued guidance to law enforcement agencies related to security of election offices?*
- *What resources can the AG's office share?*

- How will election work continue if federal or local law enforcement seeks access to a voting location, ballot facility, equipment, or voter information?

- *If voting or other election-related procedures are temporarily disrupted, what are the procedures for resuming voting and possibly extending hours?*
- *Has the state's chief election official or the AG's office released guidance on how to handle requests for access or equipment?*

- What will voters hear if law-enforcement activity near an election site creates concern or confusion?

- *Has the AG's office already developed talking points to use in response to law-enforcement activity?*
- *Are voters required to vote in a specific precinct, or can they vote at an unaffected or alternative voting location?*

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about access problems or community concerns?

- *Whom should partners contact with information from their observer/hotline programs? How should information be escalated?*
- *Will the AG's office provide updates to partner organizations on law-enforcement activity or law enforcement interference?*

Resources

- [2026 Law-Enforcement Quick Reference Guides for Every State and D.C.](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. Overview of updated state-specific field guides.
- [Early Warning Advisory: Assessing the Risk of Federal Immigration Agent Deployments to Polls](#) — **Bridging Divides Initiative**. Assesses risks from federal immigration agents, state or local law enforcement, and nearby immigration operations affecting voter access, intimidation, and election processes.
- [Law-Enforcement Quick Reference Guide Portal](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. Direct access to each state's guide.
- [Federal Agents at the Polls: Know Your Rights](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Guidance on federal, state, and local officials' conduct around polling places.
- [Community Resilience in the 2026 Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Over Zero**. Addresses local agencies operating under federal immigration-enforcement agreements.
- [Federal Laws Protecting Against Intimidation and Election Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Federal constraints on government interference with voting.
- [Understanding Local Police, the National Guard, and ICE](#) — **Democracy Security Project**. Operational distinctions among local police, National Guard, and immigration enforcement.

- [Responding to Election Harassment: How to Build a Security Task Force](#) — **Public Rights Project.** Framework for coordinating election officials, local law enforcement, emergency management, and other public-safety partners.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state laws regarding law enforcement operations near polling locations; state-specific election manuals for law enforcement officials.

Violence, Threats, or Intimidation Targeting Election Officials, Poll Workers, or Voters

The Threat

Private actors have threatened election workers, aggressively monitored ballot drop boxes, harassed voters, and made hoax bomb threats against polling and counting locations. During the 2024 election, [bomb threats briefly evacuated polling places in five battleground states](#), and additional threats [forced election offices in Maryland and California to suspend counting operations](#). In 2024, ballots were damaged when [drop boxes were set on fire in Arizona, Oregon, and Washington](#). Similar conduct could frighten voters, force evacuations, divert law-enforcement resources, compromise access to election facilities, and generate false reports of widespread disruption.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Condemn the conduct without sensationalizing it. Distinguish an isolated incident from broader conditions and give a clear reporting instruction.*

- In our state, eligible voters have the right to cast a ballot free from interference.
- Bomb hoaxes, intimidation, harassment, and blockades are not political debate. They are attempts to silence voters and disrupt the election.
- We are protecting affected locations, preserving evidence, securing ballots, and pursuing accountability.
- The lawful election process will continue, even if there's an incident at one site. Check [\[official website\]](#) for accurate information.
- Do not let intimidation take away your voice. Move to safety and report threats through [\[emergency or election incident channel\]](#).

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national nonprofit and advocacy groups will be tracking any threats or instances of voter intimidation through poll observers or monitors or voter protection hotlines. They may also be tracking disruptive poll observers or monitors who may be intimidating poll workers.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?
- Does the AG's office have relationships with election office counsel?
- Has the AG's office provided guidance to community organizations and civil society groups on what constitutes electioneering or voter intimidation? Whom should they contact if they need to report such activity?

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

 Advance Preparation to Consider	
• Completing site-specific security and continuity plans for central count facilities and other high-risk sites.	• Establishing a 24-hour threat-reporting channel.
• Conducting at least one joint exercise with election officials and law enforcement.	• Confirming how ballots, equipment, and voters will be protected during an evacuation.

- How will election officials, local government, public-safety agencies, emergency management, and the AG's office decide whether voting or counting can continue at an affected location?

- During early voting, how will the AG's office, chief election official, local government counsel, and law enforcement leaders inform each other of problems that might disrupt voting?
- Does your state have a plan to connect key personnel from these offices on Election Day? Who from the AG's office will be involved?
- During the post-election period, how will the AG's office, chief election official, local government counsel, and law enforcement leaders inform each other of any issues that might disrupt count/canvass processes?
- Who makes the final call on closing a location?
- How will closures be communicated to the polling location?

- How will voters, workers, ballots, equipment, and records be protected if the site is evacuated, locked down, closed, or moved?

- *Has the state's chief election official or the AG's office released guidance on how to handle ballots, equipment, and other records?*
- *Has guidance been issued on when to lock down or evacuate a location?*
- *If voting is temporarily disrupted, what are the procedures for resuming voting and possibly extending hours?*

- What alternative voting or election arrangements will be activated if the site cannot reopen promptly?

- *Can voters go to a different location? How will the AG's office or election officials communicate that to voters?*
- *What's the process for opening an emergency replacement location? What agencies need to be involved?*

- What will the public hear about the affected location, available voting options, and the next update?

- *How do state and local election officials communicate with voters? Can they text voters updates? Do they have social media accounts or websites that share information on voting locations?*
- *What is the communication plan between agencies to ensure voters feel safe enough to go vote, but are aware of alternate arrangements?*

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about access problems, confusion, or intimidation?

- *Whom should partners contact with information from their observer/hotline programs? How should information be escalated?*
- *Will the AG's office provide updates to community organizations and civil society groups on threats or emergencies at polling locations?*

Resources

- [Election-Security Resources](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. Guidance on site assessments, bomb threats, swatting, personal security, de-escalation, and emergency coordination.
- [Law-Enforcement Quick Reference Guides](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. State-specific summaries of relevant criminal laws and response considerations.

- [Guide to Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Treatment of blockades, weapons, online threats, aggressive observation, and harassment.
- [Protecting and Securing Voter Participation: Takeaways from the 2024 Presidential Election](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Analysis of Election Protection hotline reports and recommendations for officials.
- [Protecting Voters and Election Workers from Armed Intimidation](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Reviews state measures to prevent guns from being used to intimidate voters and election workers.
- [Is Voter Intimidation Illegal? What Should I Do If I Experience It?](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Voter-facing guidance on recognizing and reporting intimidation.
- [Responding to Election Harassment: How to Build a Security Task Force](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Steps for establishing an incident-response team and exercising threat scenarios.
- [Voting Rights: Know Your Rights](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Information about intimidation, polling-place problems, and available assistance.
- [Active Bystander Intervention and De-Escalation](#) — **Bridging Divides Initiative**. Practical actions for bystander intervention and de-escalation.
- [Emergency Incident Preparedness](#) — **Democracy Security Project**. Preparedness guidance for election-related emergency incidents.
- [De-Escalation Pocket Guide](#) — **Democracy Security Project**. Concise field reference for de-escalation.
- [Hands Off Our Vote: A Toolkit for Election Protection](#) — **Indivisible**. Provides organizers with messaging, scenario-planning, disinformation, and rapid-response resources for protecting voting access and election results.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state laws regarding threats or intimidation of election officials/poll workers; state-specific election manuals for law enforcement officials.*

Productively Managing Responsive Protests

The Threat

Peaceful demonstrations may form near election offices, central-count facilities, capitols, or courthouses in response to federal interference, disputed allegations, delayed results, or

perceived threats to voters. Previous election-related demonstrations and observer activity have involved [aggressive confrontations with election workers and pressure on counting operations](#), and U.S. intelligence officials have warned that foreign actors may attempt to amplify false claims and stoke post-election unrest. Most protests will be peaceful and constitutionally protected, but counterprotests, blocked entrances, inflammatory rhetoric, or a disproportionate police response could endanger participants and interfere with voting or counting.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Affirm the right to protest before discussing restrictions. Focus limits on conduct, not viewpoint.*

- People have the right to speak out, and voters have the right to cast ballots without obstruction. A healthy democracy protects both.
- Peaceful protests and a functioning election can happen at the same time.
- No one may threaten voters, block entrances, invade counting rooms, or interfere with ballots and equipment—whatever cause they support.
- Public-safety decisions will be based on conduct and real safety needs, not on the viewpoint of demonstrators.
- We will protect peaceful expression and act promptly against violence, intimidation, and obstruction.

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national advocacy and civil society groups may mobilize peaceful protests against election interference efforts related to law enforcement presence, federal interference, or anti-voting rallies. They may also be running get-out-the-vote efforts unrelated to any protest activity. Organizations are also likely to have their own poll observer or monitor programs providing voter assistance outside the electioneering boundary at polling locations. It is important for everyone to know the rules for their specific roles. The AG's office should be prepared for outside organizations to flag potential issues.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office have established relationships with local voting rights organizations?*
- *How will they, other civil society groups, and interested members of the public get information to the AG's office about rogue poll workers?*

- *What guidance or training can the AG's office provide to interested members of the public in advance to ensure they can peacefully protest without interfering with voting?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will election officials, local government, facility managers, the AG's office, and public-safety leaders keep a shared picture of conditions at voting/counting sites?

- *How will the AG's office assess threats to voting locations?*
- *During early voting, how will the AG's office, chief election official, local government counsel, and law enforcement leaders inform each other of problems that might disrupt voting?*
- *Does your state have a plan to connect key personnel from these offices on Election Day? Who from the AG's office will be involved?*

- How will safe access be maintained for voters, poll workers, ballot transportation, emergency responders, and the press while peaceful protests continue?

- *What guidance have poll workers received about electioneering?*
- *Are electioneering boundaries clearly marked so good-faith protesters are not interfering with voting?*
- *What guidance has the AG's office provided to law enforcement regarding electioneering and voter intimidation?*

- What will the public hear about protected protests and the election work that remains underway?

- *What guidance or resources can the AG's office share to protect First Amendment speech by organizers?*

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about access, escalating tensions, or misinformation?

- *Whom should organizations contact with information from their observer/hotline programs? How should information be escalated?*

- How will the AG's office respond if false online claims suggest that demonstrators have closed an election facility or made voting unsafe?

- *How do state and local election officials communicate with voters? Can they text voters updates? Do they have social media accounts or websites that share information on voting locations?*
- *What is the AG's office disinformation communication plan? See Chapter 2 for additional planning considerations concerning disinformation.*

Resources

- [State-Specific Law-Enforcement Quick Reference Guides](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. State-law summaries for officers responding to election-related events.
- [Community Resilience in the 2026 Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Over Zero**. Guidance on nonviolent action, responsible communications, and community response.
- [Guide to Laws Against Intimidation of Voters and Election Workers](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Helps distinguish protected expression from obstruction, menacing, and intimidation.
- [Preventing Voter Intimidation by Federal Agents at the Polls](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Explains legal protections against armed federal agents at election sites and how officials and civil society can respond while keeping voting underway.
- [Responding to Election Harassment: How to Build a Security Task Force](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Recommendations on advance coordination, role assignment, incident planning, and public-safety exercises.
- [Protecting and Securing Voter Participation: Takeaways from the 2024 Presidential Election](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Recommendations informed by incidents reported during the 2024 election.
- [Active Bystander Intervention and De-Escalation](#) — **Bridging Divides Initiative**. Practical actions for bystander intervention and de-escalation.
- [Emergency Incident Preparedness](#) — **Democracy Security Project**. Preparedness guidance for election-related emergency incidents.
- [De-Escalation Pocket Guide](#) — **Democracy Security Project**. Concise field reference for de-escalation.
- [Hands Off Our Vote: A Toolkit for Election Protection](#) — **Indivisible**. Provides organizers with messaging, scenario-planning, disinformation, and rapid-response resources for protecting voting access and election results.

- State-Specific Resources — Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., local demonstration-management plans, First Amendment guidance, de-escalation protocols.

7. Interference with Ballot Receipt, Tabulation, and Chain of Custody

Mid- or Post-Election Seizure of Ballots, Voting Machines, or Data

The Threat

Federal law-enforcement agencies have already seized or demanded ballots, voting equipment, voter information, and election records from multiple jurisdictions. The FBI [seized more than 600 boxes of Fulton County election materials](#), while Reuters documented a broader administration effort to [obtain confidential records and access to voting equipment in at least eight states](#). A seizure while votes are being received or counted could impede tabulation, separate officials from records needed to reconcile the vote, and create new chain-of-custody disputes during a close election.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: Say whether operations are continuing and make clear that a seizure is not evidence of wrongdoing.

- Every lawful vote deserves to be counted through a secure process, even when federal investigators demand materials officials still need to finish the job.
- Taking ballots, machines, or data during the count can slow the process and create the very custody questions federal officials claim to be investigating.
- Federal investigators do not get to treat completion of a lawful state election as an afterthought.
- We will continue to follow the law and ensure every eligible vote is counted.

Partners and Allies

Local and potentially national advocacy groups may be tracking federal presence at polling locations and count and canvass locations through their own poll observer or monitor programs or through calls into voter protection hotlines. They will likely push back publicly and forcefully against any narrative suggesting that elections are not secure in your state or the targeted jurisdiction. Some may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose

federal overreach, while others may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against federal efforts.

Vendors may have a duty to inform the AG's office or another state agency if the federal government attempts to seize ballots, machines, or data.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, affected local office, vendor, and technical personnel coordinate after materials are demanded or removed?

- *Do vendors have a duty to inform a state agency if materials are demanded or seized?*
- *Does the AG's office have a communication plan in place to receive information from the vendor or other state agency?*
- *What guidance can the AG's office or other agencies provide to workers in advance on removing materials?*
- *Has the AG's office provided election officials with guidance about the different kinds of authority federal agents may invoke to seize documents or equipment or to obtain information (e.g., voluntary request, administrative warrant, judicial warrant, grand jury subpoena) and how the officials' response options may differ in each circumstance?*

- What counting, reconciliation, canvassing, reporting, or other work should continue while the dispute proceeds?

- *What guidance has the AG's office or the chief election official provided to local jurisdictions?*

- How will the affected jurisdiction keep counting if ballots, machines, records, or data become unavailable?

- *What materials are absolutely required to continue the count?*
- *Do state and local jurisdictions have backup data to continue the count?*

- What will election workers and the public hear about any delay and why a seizure is not proof of wrongdoing?

- *Has the AG's office already developed talking points to use in response to potential investigations?*
- *Has the AG's office or another agency already drafted materials on the count and canvass processes?*

- How will officials put a court ruling into effect or return materials to normal operations at the affected facility?

- *If materials are returned, how will state agencies validate the chain of custody?*
- *If materials are not immediately returned, how will the AG's office enforce a court order?*
- *What guidance has been provided to workers on how to continue appropriate processes?*

Resources

- [Preparing for Law-Enforcement Demands for Election Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Preparation for warrants, subpoenas, seizures, and voluntary requests.
- [How Election Officials Respond to Law-Enforcement Requests for Access to Election Equipment and Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Overview of legal authority, custody, access, preservation, and election-security concerns.
- [Search Warrants for Election Materials](#) — **Edley Center on Law & Democracy**. Provides election-specific guidance for reviewing and narrowing search warrants to reduce disruption and protect public confidence.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.
- [Can State Prohibitions on Election Interference Constrain Federal Actors?](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Examines how state election laws may constrain federal officials who interfere with polling places, mail voting, ballots, voting equipment, or other state election processes.
- [Preparing for Federal Interference in the 2026 Midterm Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Brennan Center for Justice**. Scenario planning for seizures during active election administration.

- [Contingency Planning](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. “Continuity of Operations Plan” templates and incident-communications tools.
- [Know Your Rights: Law-Enforcement Requests for Election Information, Records, or Equipment](#) — **Lowell & Associates**. Practical guidance for organizations receiving voluntary or compelled law-enforcement requests.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., real-time inventory forms, chain-of-custody procedures, data-backup requirements, alternative tabulation plans, and 24-hour legal contacts.*

Failure or Refusal to Deliver, or Intentionally Slow Delivery of, Mail Ballots by USPS

The Threat

The Trump administration and USPS have proposed requirements that could keep election mail from being delivered unless states supply voter lists, ballot identifiers, and other information. Litigation regarding those restrictions is ongoing, but operational postal failures are already affecting voters. After a 2026 primary, [dozens of rural Nevada mail ballots were discovered too late](#) to be counted; Oregon’s Secretary of State [requested a postal review after possible ballot-delivery delays](#); and in July, USPS began investigating why [hundreds of Utah voters reportedly did not receive primary election ballots](#). Whether caused by federal policy or operational failure, delayed or missing mail can keep requested ballots from reaching voters and timely returned ballots from reaching election officials.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Do not give blanket assurances if delivery data shows problems. Tell voters what they can do to cast their ballots before the relevant deadlines.*

- Eligible voters have a right to cast their ballots. Voters who follow the rules should not lose their voices because of federal policy changes or postal delivery failures beyond their control.
- We are reviewing the available information, pressing USPS to fix problems, and identifying the communities and voters affected.
- We will not let avoidable mail failures become a backdoor way to disenfranchise lawful voters.
- Check your ballot status now by visiting [state ballot tracking website]. If it has not arrived or receipt has not been recorded as expected, contact your local election office.

- Follow the deadlines [*posted on official website*] and use an authorized drop-off or in-person return option when one is available. You can find up-to-date information on [*official state website*].

Partners and Allies

In advance of Election Day, and throughout the early voting period, advocacy and community organizations will be conducting get-out-the-vote efforts. Some will be following up with voters who requested a ballot but have not yet returned it. They may be advising voters on how to return their ballots, when return by mail is no longer the best option, when to utilize drop boxes, and when to switch to another voting method. If USPS is experiencing delays, these groups may be communicating that to voters as well. Some may also receive calls on voter protection hotlines regarding delays in delivery or receipt of mail ballots.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *What guidance have state agencies provided on voting methods, deadlines, drop boxes, and USPS delays that voting rights organizations might use?*
- *How will community organizations and other partners provide information to the AG's office on mail delays?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

 Advance Preparation to Consider	
• Confirming USPS escalation contacts before ballots are mailed.	• Establishing daily reporting on postal issues during the final voting period.
• Publishing instructions for voters whose ballots have not arrived or been recorded.	• Preparing a final-week message that emphasizes lawful ballot return options other than the mail.

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, and local election offices coordinate once a USPS delivery problem affects voters or returned ballots?

- *Is the AG's office, or the state's chief election official, in regular contact with USPS liaisons? Has the AG's office considered strengthening coordination with those liaisons to ensure election officials are aware in advance of good-faith issues that may cause delays?*
- *What guidance has been given to local election offices on reporting mail delays? How will on-the-ground issues be escalated?*

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

- What will voters hear about ballot status, replacement options, return methods, and deadlines?

- *How can voters track their mail ballot? Does the state have a ballot tracking system? Does each county?*
- *What should voters do if they decide to vote in person after requesting or receiving a mail ballot? How will this information be communicated to voters?*
- *Does the AG's office have a plan in place to communicate to voters the results of any further litigation or court rulings regarding federal efforts to limit voting by mail and what those results mean for them?*

- What support can the AG's office provide to local election officials as postal issues arise?

- *What guidance has been given to local election offices on sending replacement ballots?*
- *What guidance has been given to local election offices and polling locations on voters deciding to vote in person if they have not received their ballot?*
- *Does the AG's office have a plan in place to communicate to local election officials the results of any further litigation or court rulings regarding federal efforts to limit voting by mail and what those results mean for them?*

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about delivery problems or voter confusion?

- *What guidance have state agencies provided on voting methods, deadlines, drop boxes, and USPS delays?*
- *How will the AG's office provide additional information if there is a mail delay?*
- *How will partners get information to the AG's office?*

- How will the AG's office make sure any court order or postal commitment is carried out through the rest of the voting period?

- *Does the AG's office have contact with appropriate USPS personnel? Is the AG's office receiving regular updates on any delays?*
- *How will the AG's office provide information to USPS about apparent delays?*

Resources

- [The Trump Administration's Three-Part Attack on Mail Voting](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Overview of federal actions affecting ballot distribution, receipt deadlines, and public confidence.
- [Voting-Rights Groups Applaud Ruling Blocking Interference with Voter Rolls and Mail Ballots](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union and partner organizations**. Litigation update concerning USPS and federal voter lists.
- [Can State Prohibitions on Election Interference Constrain Federal Actors?](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Examines how state election laws may constrain federal officials who interfere with polling places, mail voting, ballots, voting equipment, or other state election processes.
- [Dates for 2026 Early In-Person and Mail Voting](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. State-by-state timeline and deadline information.
- [Defending Vote by Mail from the Trump Administration's Unconstitutional Executive Overreach](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Case background and legal framing concerning federal interference with mail voting.
- [Receipt and Postmark Deadlines for Absentee and Mail Ballots](#) — **National Conference of State Legislatures**. State-by-state reference for mail-ballot receipt and postmark deadlines.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., USPS election-mail contacts, ballot-tracking portal, receipt and postmark deadlines, authorized drop-off locations, and replacement-ballot instructions.*

Federal Orders to Cease Vote Counts, Disregard Valid Votes, or Invalidate Ballot-Cure Processes

The Threat

President Trump has attempted through executive action to restrict mail voting, impose federal eligibility requirements, and pressure states to change established election procedures. Courts have [blocked major portions of those efforts as beyond presidential authority](#), and the Supreme Court has held that states may continue counting qualifying mail ballots received after Election Day under applicable state law. During tabulation,

President Trump or another federal official could nevertheless purport to order officials to stop counting, disregard a category of ballots, or terminate a state-authorized cure process; even a legally ineffective command could create confusion and pressure local officials to exclude lawful votes.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Say immediately whether the order has legal effect. Do not allow a federal announcement to pause lawful counting by confusion alone.*

- Every eligible voter deserves to have a lawful ballot counted. No President gets to stop the process because they think it's politically inconvenient.
- The President cannot unilaterally order state officials to stop counting lawful ballots.
- Courts have already rejected major parts of this administration's effort to override state election rules.
- "Ballot cure" allows eligible voters to keep a small, fixable mistake—like a missing signature—from costing them their voice. Lawless commands from Washington cannot erase that protection.
- We will continue to follow the law and ensure every eligible vote is counted.

Partners and Allies

State and local advocacy groups, parties, or candidates are likely to file litigation to stop any attempts to pause the count or stop valid ballot-cure processes. Advocates may be running ballot-cure programs. They may also be creating voter education materials on how voters can cure a defective ballot. They may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against attempts to invalidate votes.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county legal counsel? With election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*
- *Has the AG's office or the chief election official provided guidance for community organizations and other partners on the cure process in your state?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- What should local counting officials do while a federal order is challenged or reviewed?

- *What guidance can the AG's office or other agencies provide to workers in advance of the count process in case there is a challenge?*
- *What is the process for segregating challenged or cured ballots to continue the count process while the issue is litigated?*

- Who will issue statewide instructions and keep the AG's office, chief election official, governor, local administrators, and vendors aligned?

- *Have the AG's office and chief election official created a plan in advance on how to address federal attempts to stop counting or ballot-curing processes?*
- *Have the AG's office and chief election official issued guidance in advance to local election officials, administrators, and vendors?*
- *Whom should election officials and vendors contact if the federal government comes directly to them to stop ballot counting or ballot-cure processes?*

- What will voters hear about the federal directive, the state's continuing duties, and affected ballot categories or cure procedures?

- *Have state election officials issued guidance or voter education materials on curing procedures?*
- *How do state and local election officials communicate with voters? Can they text voters updates? Do they have social media accounts or websites that share information on changes to cure procedures or affected ballot categories?*
- *Are election offices required to notify voters of a ballot that needs to be cured? How do local election offices inform voters their ballot needs to be cured?*

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about voter confusion?

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *What information will the AG's office share with community organizations and other partners on changes to ballot curing or affected ballot categories?*

- How will the AG's office make sure preliminary and final court rulings are carried out consistently?

- *How will the AG's office communicate court rulings with local election officials?*

- *How will the AG's office confirm that local election offices and workers counting ballots are complying with court rulings?*
- *How will the state respond to rogue local officials who fail to comply with court rulings or fail to continue counting ballots?*

Resources

- [Preparing for Federal Interference in the 2026 Midterm Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy and Brennan Center for Justice**. Guidance for directives affecting state election procedures.
- [Federal Laws Protecting Against Intimidation and Election Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Federal protections for officials performing election duties.
- [Effective and Efficient Ballot-Cure Procedures](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. State variations and promising practices for notification and cure.
- [A Quick Reference Guide for Election Officials: Preparing for External Federal Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice and Protect Democracy**. Offers practical guidance for election officials preparing for federal directives, data demands, armed deployments, and seizures of election materials.
- [Mail-Ballot Identity Verification](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. Review of signature, identification-number, and witness-based verification.
- [The Benefits of Pre-Processing Mail Ballots](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. Explanation of secure validation and preparation before Election Day.
- [Amici Curiae: Notice and Cure of Mail-In Ballots](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Operational and voter-protection reasons for notifying voters and allowing correction of ballot defects.
- [Amici Curiae: Provisional Ballots to Correct Mail-In Ballot Defects](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Addresses provisional ballots as a failsafe and the consequences of last-minute procedural changes.
- [Threats to Election Officials: Informational Guide for Law Enforcement](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Guidance on reporting, investigation, coordination, and support.
- [2026 Law-Enforcement Quick Reference Guides](#) — **Committee for Safe and Secure Elections**. State-specific law summaries and response guidance.
- [Contingency Planning](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Continuity and incident-communications resources.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state laws and manuals regarding vote tabulation procedures.*

Delayed Reporting of Unofficial Vote Counts

The Threat

President Trump, other candidates, and political organizations have previously portrayed ordinary post-election counting as evidence of fraud and prepared litigation challenging ballots and results before counting was complete. Before the 2024 election, President Trump's allies pursued [more than 120 lawsuits across 26 states challenging election procedures](#), and additional litigation sought to challenge groups of provisional ballots while counting continued. In a close 2026 New York legislative primary, [fraud accusations halted ballot counting](#). Similar claims could exploit ordinary delays caused by close margins and the counting of provisional, cured, military, overseas, or timely mailed ballots, even though election-night totals are necessarily incomplete and unofficial.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Do not apologize for careful counting or promise a result by a politically convenient deadline. Explain what remains and when the next update will come.*

- Every eligible voter deserves to have their lawful ballot counted, even when that careful work takes longer than politicians or television networks would prefer.
- Election-night numbers are unofficial and incomplete. They are the beginning of reporting—not the end of the legal count.
- A changing margin on election night is common—it means additional lawful ballots are being counted under rules set before Election Day.
- Political actors may call ordinary counting suspicious when the numbers move against them. Their impatience does not change the law or our duty to voters.
- We will publish verified updates and then count, reconcile, canvass, and certify the outcome based on every eligible ballot.

Partners and Allies

Many states' election officials as well as state and local nonprofit and advocacy organizations are likely creating materials on how votes are counted in the state, applicable mail-ballot deadlines, normal delays facing voters covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, and other ordinary procedures in the state that impact the timing of counting ballots. This pre-bunking effort, combined with consistent messaging from state agencies as the election process proceeds, can help voters maintain confidence in the election process.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *Has the state's chief election official or the AG's office released guidance on count and canvass procedures and the timing of all election processes?*
- *Will the AG's office provide updates to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public on any delays in the process?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will state and local officials keep a shared, accurate picture of which ballots remain and what work is still underway?

- *When does mail-ballot processing and counting begin in your state? Does your state allow pre-processing of ballots?*
- *If your state allows pre-processing, how will state and local election officials share information with other agencies?*
- *On and after Election Day, how does count information get shared across state agencies?*

- How will reporting procedures be explained before Election Day so voters do not first hear about them during a close contest?

- *Has the state's chief election official or the AG's office released voter education materials on count and canvass procedures and the timing of all election processes?*
- *What pre-bunking has been done to inform voters of reporting processes?*

- Who will provide public updates and how often will they occur?

- What added communications, staffing, technical, or security help may later-reporting jurisdictions need?

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about public confusion, false claims, or harassment?

- *How will the AG's office provide additional information about the count process or any delays?*
- *How will partners get information to the AG's office if they see false claims, public confusion, or harassment of election workers?*

Resources

- [2026 Pre-Processing Timelines](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. State-by-state rules governing when mail-ballot validation and scanning may begin.
- [The Benefits of Pre-Processing Mail Ballots](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. Explanation of how preprocessing supports accuracy, efficiency, and timely reporting.
- [Effective and Efficient Ballot-Cure Procedures](#) — **Center for Election Innovation & Research**. Explains cure timelines and why results may remain incomplete after Election Day.
- [Election Mistrust Runs High. Your Newsroom Can Help.](#) — **Poynter**. Shows how explanatory reporting on election procedures and safeguards can build public trust and resilience against false claims.
- [Election Season Communication Guidance for State and Local Officials](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Guidance on explaining counting, delayed results, security, and official information sources.
- [Understanding the Latest Challenges to Elections in Battleground States](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Election officials explain why some jurisdictions report later and why accuracy takes priority over speed.
- [Election Subversion: The 2024 Election and Recommendations to Address Vulnerabilities](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Analysis of post-election disinformation, procedural challenges, and vulnerabilities.
- [Misinformation Doesn't Stop When Polls Close: Three Things to Watch After Election Day](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Addresses misinformation and political-violence risks during counting, certification, and other sensitive post-election periods.
- [To Stop Election-Related Misinformation, Give Election Officials the Resources They Need](#) — **Center for Democracy & Technology**. Explains how predictable reporting delays create openings for misinformation and why election officials need resources to process ballots and explain the count.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state laws and manuals regarding unofficial vote-count reporting.*

8. Interference with Certification, Refusals to Certify, and Refusals to Seat Validly Elected Officeholders

Refusals to Certify by Local or State Election Officials

The Threat

In recent years, local election officials have repeatedly voted against certification or threatened to withhold it based on unsupported fraud claims and disagreement with election procedures. Across the country [election skeptics have gained seats on local election boards and offices, including some who have previously refused to certify results](#). At the same time, courts have routinely held that local officials [have a mandatory duty to certify election results](#). A refusal in 2026 could delay statewide certification, create uncertainty about the lawful winners, and encourage officials in other jurisdictions to follow suit.

⚠ Early Warning Signs ⚠	
• Current officials have previously refused to certify based on spurious “questions” about routine election procedures.	• Board members demand investigative authority beyond their role.
• A board postpones routine canvass or certification meetings.	• Officials cite generalized suspicions without identifying specific concerns.
• Officials refuse training or question whether certification is mandatory.	• Outside groups pressure officials to withhold certification.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Keep the focus on the voters’ decision. Explain that certification is a duty and that genuine disputes must be resolved according to the law and the state’s established procedures.*

- The voters choose the winners. Election officials do not get to replace the people’s decision with their own.
- Certification is a legal duty—not a chance to hold up the results until officeholders get the outcome they want.

- Courts have made this clear again and again: unsupported suspicions are not a lawful reason to refuse certification.
- If someone has a genuine dispute, the law provides for recounts, audits, election contests, and court review. Refusing to certify is not one of those options.
- We will make sure the lawful results are certified, and the voters' decisions are respected.

Partners and Allies

Local certification is an extremely high priority for local election protection partners as well as candidates and campaigns. National organizations and/or campaign organizations will likely file mandamus or declaratory judgment suits as soon as local certification deadlines are missed, in the absence of any affirmative indications that state offices will be moving expeditiously to address the issue. Developing clear lines of communication in advance of a crisis will help reduce confusion, align messaging, and increase public confidence.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

 Advance Preparation to Consider	
• Completing a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction certification calendar.	• Collecting contact information for clerks of court and judicial officers in jurisdictions at risk of certification issues.
• Giving responsible officials written legal guidance on whether state law treats certification as ministerial or discretionary.	• Preparing communications explaining that certification is mandatory but does not eliminate available recounts or contests.
• Working with your chief election official to establish communications channels with legal representation for interested parties in advance of the election.	• Identifying the decision-maker and backup authority for every step in the certification process as well as escalation protocols and contacts.

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, governor's office, and affected local officials coordinate after a threatened or actual refusal?

- *Has the AG's office already had conversations with state election officials on how to proceed if local officials refuse to certify?*

- How will the rest of the certification calendar move forward while the refusal is addressed?

- *Does state law allow the state's chief election official to certify political subdivisions in lieu of local election offices?*

- What will the refusing board, its staff, other certification officials, and the public hear about the duty to certify and the lawful ways to challenge an election?

- *Has the AG's office developed and distributed a legal opinion on state certification laws and the consequences of a violation of a legal duty?*

- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and other interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about public confusion or similar threats elsewhere?

- How will the AG's office make sure any court order requiring certification is carried out in a timely manner?

Resources

- [Election Certification](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Overview of certification duties, recent interference, and recommended statutory safeguards.
- [Election Certification, Explained](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Explains why certification is a mandatory duty, how it differs from canvassing and election contests, and what tools are available when officials refuse to certify.
- [State-Specific Guides to Protecting Election Certification from Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice, Campaign Legal Center, Protect Democracy, and All Voting Is Local**. Guides for seven battleground states.
- [State Election Certification Processes and Guardrails](#) — **Campaign Legal Center, All Voting Is Local, Brennan Center for Justice, and Protect Democracy**. Provides general and state-specific guidance on certification duties and responses to delays or refusals to certify.
- [2026 Election Risk Heat Map](#) — **Voting Rights Lab**. Maps state- and county-level conditions that may increase the risk of election interference, disputes, and certification challenges.
- [New Guides to Protecting Election Certification from Interference in Battleground States](#) — **Campaign Legal Center and partner organizations**. Introduction to the guides and available enforcement mechanisms.

- [New Guidance on Preventing Election-Certification Interference](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Explanation of the mandatory nature of election certification and remedies for refusals.
- [Amici Curiae: State Election Board Rules and Certification](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Explains why certification is mandatory and how open-ended inquiry rules can produce obstruction and delay.
- [Local Officials Cannot Block Election Certification. But They Can Fuel Disinformation.](#) — **Just Security**. Outlines legal protections against refusal to certify while highlighting the dangers of misinformation that may undermine public confidence when local officials refuse to certify.
- [How State Supreme Courts Can Prevent Prolonged Election Contests](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Explains how state supreme courts can use supervisory and rulemaking powers to help resolve election contests promptly.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., certification requirements and calendar, guidance to local officials, vacancy rules, enforcement procedures.*

Federal Intimidation of Election Officials Prior to Certification

The Threat

DOJ has [threatened election officials with possible criminal liability](#) and used federal investigative powers to obtain records and personal information connected to previous elections. Immediately before certification, federal officials could threaten prosecution, open investigations, demand additional records, or publicly accuse responsible officials of misconduct in an effort to make them delay or reject verified results. Even without a formal federal order, pressure directed at individual officials could lead to absences, resignations, or refusals to perform required certification duties.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Separate federal accusations from the legal certification standard. Say clearly whether deadlines and duties remain unchanged.*

- The voters' decision must be certified according to law—not rewritten because of threats from Washington.
- A federal accusation, subpoena, or investigation does not overturn the people's votes and does not suspend state deadlines.

- The Trump administration cannot use threats of prosecution to give Washington a veto over state election results.
- We will protect officials who perform their duties lawfully in the face of federal intimidation.
- Unless a court with lawful authority orders otherwise, the state will complete certification on time, according to the law.

Partners and Allies

Nonprofit and advocacy partners and allies may already be working with state and local election officials to ensure they know their rights and may be organizing legal representation for targeted officials, when permitted by state law. Some may seek to intervene in any litigation filed to oppose federal overreach, while others may begin to mobilize peaceful protests against federal efforts.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with local voter protection organizations?*
- *Does the AG's office already have relationships with county attorneys? With local election office counsel?*
- *Which organizations in your state are already working closely with local election offices?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- What will targeted certification officials be told about the deadlines and duties that remain unchanged?

- *Has the AG's office already developed specific legal guidance or opinions on certification requirements under state law?*

- How will certification continue if an official becomes unavailable or unable to act because of federal pressure?

- *Has the state's chief election official identified vulnerable jurisdictions?*
- *Has the AG's office researched quorum requirements and replacement procedures for local board members in key jurisdictions?*

- What legal, security, communications, workplace, or personal support may affected officials need?

- *Does the AG's office have the legal authority to represent political subdivisions? Do the state's local offices have sufficient representation?*

- What will the public hear about why a federal accusation or investigation does not suspend certification?

- *See also the section above on local refusals to certify.*

- How will court rulings or changes in federal posture reach certification officials before the deadline?

- *Does your state's chief election official have a means of rapid communication with all local election officials?*
- *Does the AG's office need to establish its own means of direct communication with certification officials?*

Resources

- [Election Certification](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Certification duties and recommended safeguards.
- [New Guidance on Preventing Election-Certification Interference](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Remedies and planning for delays or refusals.
- [Election Certification, Explained](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Explains why certification is a mandatory duty, how it differs from canvassing and election contests, and what tools are available when officials refuse to certify.
- [What's Breaking Through About the Justice Department's Election Investigations](#) — **States United Democracy Center**. Tested messages addressing federal investigations and threats.
- [Federal Laws Protecting Against Intimidation and Election Interference](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Protections for officials performing election-related duties.
- [Model Bill: State Accountability for Federal Interference in Elections](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Provides model state legislation to deter and address interference or voter intimidation by federal and state officials.
- [Amici Curiae: State Election Board Rules and Certification](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Explains why generalized allegations or political pressure cannot justify delaying certification.
- [Responding to Election Harassment: How to Build a Security Task Force](#) — **Public Rights Project**. Advance-planning measures for protecting officials facing harassment while performing election duties.

- [How State Supreme Courts Can Prevent Prolonged Election Contests](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Explains how state supreme courts can use supervisory and rulemaking powers to help resolve election contests promptly.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state laws regarding intimidation of election officials; contact information for appropriate legal representation.*

Post-Certification Seizure of Ballots or Election Equipment

The Threat

The FBI and other law-enforcement agencies have seized or demanded ballots, equipment, and records from completed elections. In January 2026, the FBI [seized hundreds of boxes of Fulton County’s 2020 ballots and related materials](#), and the FBI subsequently [obtained records connected to Arizona’s 2020 election review](#). After the 2026 election, a similar seizure could be used to reopen rejected allegations or suggest publicly that a certified result remained suspect; seizure could create chain-of-custody issues for recounts or audits.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *State plainly that a seizure does not undo certification. Do not let the drama of a search become the message.*

- Voters should know that a certified result cannot be erased by a dramatic search or seizure after the lawful election process is complete.
- Taking custody of ballots or equipment is not proof that the result was wrong.
- A seizure does not undo certification, invalidate lawful votes, or create a new election contest.
- The state will continue protecting the official record, voter privacy, chain of custody, and the security of equipment used in future elections.
- Legitimate investigations can proceed without misleading the public about the legal status of a certified result.

Partners and Allies

Allies will likely issue strong, urgently worded condemnation of any attempt to seize ballots and/or equipment, particularly if such a seizure occurs prior to the expiration of the recount and/or state election contest deadline. When groups are alerted to such activities, they will likely send legal observers to monitor and document the seizure. State and local elected officials will likely involve their offices and potentially their campaigns, where relevant, to object to intervention. The risk of escalation to a confrontation would be high under this scenario.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

- *Has the AG's office already established lines of communication with local, state, and national organizing groups?*
- *How will the AG's office engage with the offices of the governor and the chief state election official as quickly as possible?*

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the AG's office, chief election official, custodian, local election office, vendor, and technical personnel coordinate after certified election materials are demanded or removed?

- *Have the AG's office and chief election official already created a coordination and escalation plan?*
- *Has the AG's office provided election officials with guidance about the different kinds of authority federal agents may invoke to seize documents or equipment or to obtain information (e.g., voluntary request, administrative warrant, judicial warrant, grand jury subpoena) and how officials' response options may differ in each circumstance?*

- How will audits, recounts, retention duties, and preparation for future elections or runoffs continue while materials remain outside normal custody?

- *Has your chief election official created contingency plans for loss of access to necessary equipment?*
- *Are there plans to create and secure backup copies of electronic documentation?*
- *How would your state conduct a mandatory audit or recount if election records are seized?*

- What will local officials and the public hear about why the seizure does not undo certification or invalidate lawful votes?

- **How will returned or accessed equipment be inspected, tested, or recertified before future use?**

- *Do different jurisdictions in your state use different certification labs?*

- **How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about public confusion?**

- *Has the AG's office established a coordination plan with local and state partners?*

Resources

- [Preparing for Law-Enforcement Demands for Election Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Guidance for handling warrants, subpoenas, seizures, and election-record demands.
- [How Election Officials Respond to Law-Enforcement Requests for Access to Election Equipment and Materials](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Overview of custody, preservation, outside access, security, and legal authority.
- [Search Warrants for Election Materials](#) — **Edley Center on Law & Democracy**. Provides election-specific guidance for reviewing and narrowing search warrants to reduce disruption and protect public confidence.
- [Election Technology Resources](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Security, testing, certification, and access-control guidance.
- [Contingency Planning](#) — **U.S. Election Assistance Commission**. Continuity planning for unavailable or potentially compromised equipment and records.
- [Know Your Rights: Law-Enforcement Requests for Election Information, Records, or Equipment](#) — **Lowell & Associates**. Practical guidance for organizations receiving voluntary or compelled law-enforcement requests.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., post-certification retention schedules, custody records and requirements, audit documentation, recertification requirements.*

Refusals to Seat Validly Elected Officeholders

The Threat

Some party officials and election observers have expressed concern that a congressional majority [could refuse to seat candidates](#) who win and are certified as the prevailing

candidates after the 2026 midterms. A legislative chamber could invoke unsupported fraud claims, political objections, or its authority to judge its members' qualifications as grounds for denying a certified winner the office.

Key Messages

Comms. Note: *Treat this as a lower-probability contingency. Center the certified election result and the established process for genuine disputes.*

- Voters—not politicians—decide who represents them following a lawful election.
- Once the votes are counted, reviewed, and certified, politicians cannot invent a new process simply because they dislike the result.
- Congress's authority to judge its members' qualifications is not a license to disregard a valid election or recycle unsupported fraud claims.
- The law provides recounts, election contests, and judicial review. Refusing to seat a certified winner is not a substitute for those processes.
- We will defend the certified result and support an orderly, lawful transfer of authority.

Partners and Allies

Under the Constitution, each chamber of Congress is “the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” Leading experts at democracy-protection nonprofit organizations have spent significant time and resources looking into the technical details of the procedures the House and Senate will use to resolve disputed elections. These experts have also been in touch with the offices of the parliamentarians of the House and the Senate, who play crucial roles in advising on the resolution of contested elections. Candidates, and the parties of which they are members, also have strong incentives to ensure they are timely sworn in and seated at the opening of the next Congress. The most important step state leaders can take to help ensure the prompt seating of their state's congressional delegation is certifying the winners of the election by all lawful deadlines, and in any case, in advance of January 3, 2027.

Consider which partners and allies state officials should contact, when, and how.

Your Plan

The following considerations are meant only to stimulate your planning, not limit or direct it.

- How will the AG's office, election officials, governor's office, and the certified winner's representatives coordinate if a refusal to seat occurs?

- What will officials and the public hear about the certified result and the lawful ways to resolve a genuine dispute?
- How will the AG's office communicate accurate information to community organizations, civil society groups, and interested members of the public, and what does the AG's office expect to learn from them about public confusion or related developments?

Resources

- [Election Certification](#) — **Brennan Center for Justice**. Background on the final administrative determination of election results.
- [Protecting Free and Fair Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Materials on protecting results, lawful transfers of power, and interference with election outcomes.
- [How the Trump Administration Plans to Interfere with the 2026 Elections](#) — **Protect Democracy**. Analysis of efforts to disrupt election administration and deny unwanted outcomes.
- [Defending Our Vote: Election-Safeguarding Program](#) — **American Civil Liberties Union**. Nationwide initiative focused on voting, counting, certification, and respecting electoral outcomes.
- [Election Subversion: The 2024 Election and Recommendations to Address Vulnerabilities](#) — **Campaign Legal Center**. Analysis of post-election subversion and efforts to reject lawful outcomes.
- [How State Supreme Courts Can Prevent Prolonged Election Contests](#) — **State Democracy Research Initiative**. Explains how state supreme courts can use supervisory and rulemaking powers to help resolve election contests promptly.
- [State-Specific Resources](#) — *Consider collecting additional resources specific to your state – e.g., state laws and guidance regarding certification of election winners, transmission of certification to Congress, and congressional vacancies.*

Appendix: Key Contacts

See below for contacts your office may want to have on hand before and after Election Day.

Multistate AG Contacts

AG – Front Office Contacts

- [State Name]
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

AG – Communications Contacts

- [State Name]
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

AG – Election-Related Litigation Contacts

- [State Name]
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

Governor's Office Contacts

Governor's Office – Contacts for Election-Related Issues

- [Contact's Name and Role]
- [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
- [Contact's Email Address]

Governor's Office – Communications Contacts

- [Contact's Name and Role]
- [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
- [Contact's Email Address]

Secretary of State / Chief Election Official Contacts

SoS / Chief Election Official – Front Office Contacts

- [Contact's Name and Role]
- [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
- [Contact's Email Address]

SoS / Chief Election Official – Communications Contacts

- [Contact's Name and Role]
- [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
- [Contact's Email Address]

State and Local Contacts

Other State Officials and Individual Contacts by Agency

- **[State Agency]**
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

Local Election Officials

- **[Local Jurisdiction and Office Name]**
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

Judicial System Contacts

- **[Court Name]**
 - [Contact's Name and Role – e.g., chief/duty judges, clerks of court]
 - [Contact's Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

Local Law Enforcement

- **[Local Law Enforcement Agency Name]**
 - [Contact's Name and Role]

- [Contact's Direct Line]
- [Contact's Email Address]

Other Local Officials – E.g., Mayors, County Executives, etc.

- **[Jurisdiction / Office]**
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

Local 501(c)(3) Voter Protection Table

- **[Organization]**
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]

National Nonprofit Partners and Subject-Matter Experts

[Subject Matter or Domain of Expertise]

- **[Organization]**
 - [Contact's Name and Role]
 - [Contact's Cell Phone Number or Direct Line]
 - [Contact's Email Address]